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JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION 
IN HYBRID LAW CASES 
John F. Preis • 
An everlasting debate in the federal courts field is which branch of 
the federal government has the power to control federal jurisdiction. 
While some commentators and judges assert that the judiciary has the 
implicit authority to refine the boundaries of its jurisdiction, others 
argue that Article III vests that authority with Congress only and 
judicial modification of jurisdiction is illegitimate. In focusing almost 
entirely on the constitutional legitimacy of the question, this debate 
has overlooked an important consideration: Even if the judiciary may 
legitimately wield discretion in setting its jurisdiction, is such 
discretion functionally appropriate? 
This Article argues that such discretion is not always appropriate. 
Relying on an empirical analysis of two decades of cases in one area 
of federal jurisdiction-hybrid law jurisdiction-the Article 
demonstrates that some jurisdictional questions are better resolved by 
simple, bright-line rules. Drawing on extensive scholarship studying 
rules and standards-which until now has not yet been applied in this 
field-the Article concludes that the particular (and often 
misunderstood) nature of hybrid law cases calls for a rule rather than 
a standard. This conclusion, while limited to the field of hybrid law 
jurisdiction, nonetheless suggests that the debate over judicial 
discretion in jurisdictional questions is too narrow. Only by 
considering functionality as well as legitimacy can the proper 
jurisdictional directives be formulated. 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Vanderbilt University 
School of Law; B.S., Cornell University. This Article benefited greatly from comments by Jim 
Concannon, Barry Friedman, Alex Glashausser, Rob Rhee, Bill Rich and Jim Wilson. In addition, 
Kevin Zolotor provided valuable research assistance throughout the project. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most engrossing debates in the field of federal courts 
concerns congressional control of federal jurisdiction. One aspect of 
this debate is role of the judiciary in defining its own jurisdiction. On 
one side of the debate are those who argue that Article III bestows 
Congress with plenary power to control federal jurisdiction and that the 
judiciary therefore has no role in its determination. 1 On the other side 
are those who contend that the federal judiciary-with its comparative 
expertise in jurisdictional considerations-should have leeway to refine 
its jurisdiction as needed.2 Along the continuum between these two 
positions are numerous other views.3 
While this argument has both descriptive and normative elements, the 
chief normative concern has always been legitimacy.4 That is, in light of 
Article III and other relevant sources of law, is it legitimate for the 
judiciary to exert any control over its jurisdiction? While the legitimacy 
question is an essential inquiry, it is not the sole question that should be 
explored. Even if one believes that the judiciary may define the 
contours of its jurisdiction, that does not per force require the judiciary 
to exercise its discretion in that field. Many commentators have 
observed that broad discretion in the hands of judges often leads to 
complex and often conflicting doctrine-typically an undesirable result.5 
I. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 3-7, 47-139 
(1991) (arguing that "underlying normative principles of American political theory"-the 
representational and countermajoritarian principles-suggest that the judiciary should closely follow 
congressional dictates in asserting or declining jurisdiction); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation 
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Phillip B. Kurland, Toward 
a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 
( 1959); Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional 
Common Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (1991). 
2. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574-88 (1985); 
Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong about Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097 (1985); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891 (2004). 
3. See, e.g, Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. I, 2 (1990) (arguing that "the boundaries of federal jurisdiction-and 
the authority to define that jurisdiction-evolve through a dialogic process of congressional enactment 
and judicial response"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A 
Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1289, 1329 (2005) (arguing that "Article Ill requires federal courts to decide 'all cases' but not all 
'Controversies"' and that federal judges may decide to "punt" certain "Controversies"). 
4. The leading article describing the discretion employed by federal courts in defining their 
jurisdiction is Shapiro, supra note 2, at 548-59 (noting the myriad ways in which federal courts exert 
control over their jurisdiction, such as the doctrines of abstention, justiciability, and exhaustion, as well 
as the interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes). 
5. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 
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Therefore, even if scholars could solve the legitimacy problem, they 
would have to face a secondary problem: the risk of doctrinal instability. 
The role of discretion in judicially-created jurisdictional doctrine 
assumed a central role recently in the Supreme Court case Grable & 
Sons Metal Prod. Inc. v. Darue Eng 'g & Mfg. Co. 6 Grable & Sons was 
a "hybrid law" case, meaning that it involved both state and federal law. 
The question for the Supreme Court was whether this suit-being a 
traditional state law cause of action-fell within the district court's 
federal question jurisdiction because its disposition turned on the 
interpretation of a federal statute. The Court held that the suit "arose 
under" federal law and therefore fell within federal question 
jurisdiction. 7 While this holding may not seem particularly remarkable, 
what is remarkable is the analysis the Court used to determine whether 
to assert jurisdiction in hybrid law cases. Declining to promulgate a 
"'single, precise, all-embracing' test for jurisdiction," the Court instead 
instructed lower courts to inquire whether a "state-law claim necessarily 
raise[ s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a 
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally 
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. "8 In other 
words, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to use their discretion 
to determine when to assert federal question jurisdiction. While this 
discretion is not unlimited, its boundaries are far and wide. A district 
court will feel little constrained by the Supreme Court's mandate to 
consider the "congressionally approved balance of federal and state 
judicial responsibilities."9 Thus, Grable & Sons stands for the 
proposition that discretion within the lower courts is preferable to a 
bright-line rule for determining jurisdiction over hybrid law cases. 
This Article disagrees with the Supreme Court on this issue and, in 
doing so, demonstrates that the "legitimacy" debate in the federal courts 
field is inappropriately narrow. A fuller debate of "jurisdiction and 
discretion" should take account of functionality as well as legitimacy. 
To make this case, the Article relies on an analysis of every hybrid law 
jurisdiction decision published by a circuit court since 1986 (the year the 
DUKE L.J. I, 10-11 (1992) (documenting an increase in legal complexity and attributing it in part to an 
increase in discretionary, standard-based legal directives). To be sure, the problem of stability is not 
unrelated to the problem of legitimacy. Inasmuch as discretion and the ensuing doctrinal fuzziness 
weaken the rule of law, the legitimacy of the institution is weakened. A lawsaying institution with a 
weak rule of law is typically viewed as less legitimate than institutions with a stronger rule of law. See 
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953,974-78 (1995). 
6. 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005). 
7. !d. at 2368. 
8. !d. 
9. !d. at 2367. 
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Court last addressed hybrid law jurisdiction questions). 10 Building on 
this description of hybrid law doctrine, the Article then turns to a 
description of rules and standards. After identifying the traits of each 
legal form, the Article concludes that a rule is preferable to a standard 
for jurisdictional issues in hybrid law cases. Having established this, the 
Article relies on the commonly accepted purposes of federal jurisdiction 
to argue that federal courts should assert jurisdiction over hybrid law 
cases only when the federal question embedded in the state cause of 
action is supported by a federal cause of action. 
Contrary to this analysis, the Supreme Court has already chosen a 
discretionary approach and is unlikely to revisit the issue anytime soon 
(much less, reverse its position). The purpose of this Article, however, 
is not solely to advocate for a rule-bound approach; rather, it is to show 
that the debate over discretion in jurisdiction cannot take place solely in 
the realm oflegitimacy. Instead, functionality must be an essential, even 
if secondary, consideration. 
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION IN HYBRID LAW CASES 
Federal question jurisdiction has its genesis, of course, in Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution. Section 2 of that article states that "The 
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the Untied States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." 11 The modern 
scope of federal question jurisdiction, however, is not controlled by 
Article Ill but rather by an implementing statute first passed by 
Congress in 1875. Though the statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, employs the same "arising under" language used in Article III, 12 
statutory federal question jurisdiction is in practice much narrower than 
its constitutional counterpart. 13 
I 0. Numbering 67 in all, these cases are listed and described in the Appendix at the end of the 
Article. 
II. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
12. Section 1331 provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
13. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank ofNig., 461 U.S. 480,494-95 (1983) ("Although the language 
of § 1331 parallels that of the 'arising under' clause of Article lll, this Court never has held that 
statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Article Ill 'arising under' jurisdiction."). See 
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, § 5.2 at 266-67 (2003) (addressing the 
distinction between jurisdiction under Article Ill and under§ 1331). For excellent historical accounts of 
the statutory grant of jurisdiction see James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of 
Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. & AM. L. REG. L. REV. 639 (1942) and Ray Forrester, The Nature of a 
"Federal Question," 16 TuL. L. REV. 362,374-77 (1942). 
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Determining whether a matter "arises under" federal law for the 
purposes of § 1331 is usually quite simple. Justice Holmes famously 
explained in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. that "[a] 
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." 14 Thus, the 
existence of a federal cause of action for a given federal law guarantees 
one access to a federal court. Yet, as has been noted, Justice Holmes's 
test for jurisdiction is "more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion 
for which it was intended."15 Put differently, while the existence of a 
federal cause of action demonstrates that a litigant's case arises under 
federal law, 16 the lack of a federal cause has not been considered fatal-
in most federal courts at least-to federal question jurisdiction. Cases 
that generally fall in this latter category, i.e., cases involving federal law 
but not a federal cause of action, are typically of two types: (1) cases 
relying wholly on the federal law for relief, and (2) cases relying 
primarily on state law for relief but involving some aspect of federal 
law. The first type of case-which this Article does not address-is one 
where a party seeks to enforce a federal right but cannot point to a 
congressionally created right of action. While the general rule is that 
these cases are not cognizable in federal courts, 17 generous debate about 
the appropriate rule continues. 18 The second type of case, which this 
14. 241 u.s. 257,260 (1916). 
15. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); see also Franchise 
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 9 (1983) ("[I]t is well settled 
that Justice Holmes' test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the 
district courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court 
jurisdiction."). 
16. A rare exception to this arises when Congress creates a right of action empowering a litigant 
to bring suit but also directs that state law govern the disposition of the suit. In such a situation, federal 
question jurisdiction has been held inappropriate. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 
513 (1900). 
17. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (refusing to imply a cause of action under Title 
VI because the statute's text and legislative history revealed no congressional intent to allow private 
enforcement); but see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (implying a right of 
action under Title IX for a wrongful discharge suit by a male basketball coach who complained about 
discrimination against his female players). 
18. For arguments in support of implying a federal right of action, see, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, 
Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 665, 666 (1987) (arguing that the existence of federal right is sufficient to imply a right 
of action attendant to that right); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An 
Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court's separate 
inquiries into rights, rights of action and remedies); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in 
Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864-65 
(1996); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 
322 (1995) (arguing that a right under the constitution should be "self-executing" and that a right of 
action should not be required to enforce one's constitutional rights). 
For arguments against implying federal rights of action, see, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
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Article does address, is one where a party seeks to enforce a state right 
but, for whatever reason, the resolution of the state law claim will 
involve the interpretation of federal law. As explained in detail later in 
this Part, there are three main ways in which a state claim may involve 
the interpretation of federal law. 19 For the present discussion, however, 
a simple example will suffice. 
Suppose a landowner rents land to a farmer. Because the landowner 
wishes to preserve the environmental integrity of the land, he insists on 
the following clause in the contract: "Farmer agrees to comply with all 
applicable state and federal environmental laws during the term of this 
contract." One day, the landowner observes the farmer dumping used 
oil on a portion of the land. The landowner then brings suit in state 
court against the farmer for breach of contract, citing a federal 
environmental regulation prohibiting the farmer's conduct. The farmer 
removes the case to federal court on the ground that the court would 
have to interpret federal law to determine whether the farmer breached 
the contract. Thus, on a motion to remand by the landowner, a federal 
court would be called on to determine if the state-law breach of contract 
action posed a federal question such that federal jurisdiction would be 
appropriate. 20 
Federal courts have employed a variety of doctrines to analyze these 
types of jurisdictional questions. Although the doctrines have been 
repeatedly misstated and confused with each other, four distinct 
doctrines do in fact exist. These doctrines are (1) the well-pleaded 
complaint rule,21 (2) the necessity test,22 (3) complete preemption 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, 
Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1117 (1978) (arguing that the Court 
lacks power to imply causes of action without congressional authority). 
19. See discussion infra Part II.B. I. 
20. This example necessarily assumes, as do all similar examples in this Article, that the parties 
are non-diverse. 
21. A "well-pleaded complaint" is one that, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, invokes federal 
law. Such complaints merit federal jurisdiction while those without a federal issue do not. Left out of 
any consideration under the well-pleaded complaint rule is whether the defendant's answer or asserted 
defenses implicate any federal questions. Nor may federal jurisdiction lie if the plaintiff anticipates a 
federal defense and preemptively responds to it the complaint. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). For criticisms of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see, e.g., LARRY W. 
Y ACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS, I 02-05 ( 1994); Donald Doemberg, There "s No Reason 
For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); Martin H. Redish. Reassessing the Allocation of 
Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and ''The Martian 
Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794-97 (1992). 
22. Where a complaint involves state and federal issues, federal jurisdiction will obtain only 
where success on the federal issue is necessary to the plaintiff's success in the case. Thus, if a plaintiff 
advances three separate theories in his complaint, each of which he alleges entitle him to relief, and only 
one of those theories implicates federal law, then federal jurisdiction will not lie because relief could be 
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analysis,23 and (4) substantiality analysis. Substantiality analysis, which 
is the focus of the Article and the analysis ostensibly used in Grable & 
Sons, differs from the other three methods in that it instructs judges to 
consider principles of federalism in each and every instance, rather than 
simply to follow a bright-line rule that follows these same federalism 
principles. 
The remainder of this Part describes substantiality analysis in detail. 
The relevant Supreme Court cases are first discussed, followed by the 
lower court cases decided over the past two decades. 
A. Substantiality Analysis in the Supreme Court 
Substantiality analysis seeks to determine whether the federal 
question embedded within the state right of action is "substantial" 
enough to warrant the energies of a federal court-the notion being that 
insignificant or tangential federal issues do not merit federal jurisdiction. 
This Section will introduce the general contours of substantiality 
analysis by discussing several Supreme Court cases dealing with this 
issue, among them Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, and Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue 
Eng'g&Mfg. 
obtained without reference to federal law. Put another way, jurisdiction will not obtain because federal 
law is not necessary to his case. The relevant Supreme Court case on "necessity analysis" is 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). For a detailed and incisive 
analysis of Christianson, see John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative 
Unit: When Does What "Arise Under" Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829 (1998). 
23. In hybrid law cases, complete preemption analysis inquires whether the state law implicated 
in the plaintiffs suit occupies a field that has been completely preempted by federal law. If the state law 
is completely preempted, then the state law is "necessarily federal in character" and federal jurisdiction 
may be invoked. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 56, 63--64 (1987). It is odd that complete 
preemption should be grounds for federal jurisdiction because preemption claims almost always arise as 
defenses and, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal defense cannot create federal jurisdiction. 
As has been noted, this amounts to an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Karen A. 
Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
927, 939 (1996) ("[T]he doctrine of complete preemption is an exception, or corollary, to the well-
pleaded complaint rule."). 
The seminal case in complete preemption analysis is Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int 'I Ass 'n 
of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). For a helpful exegesis of complete preemption analysis in the 
Supreme Court and lower courts, see Arthur R. Miller, Artfo/ Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of 
Definition, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1781, 1793-1800 (1998). 
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1. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Company 
Decided in 1921, Smith is generally regarded as the start of modem 
hybrid law jurisdiction.Z4 The case involved a shareholder's challenge 
to his company's intention to purchase various federal bonds. The 
shareholder contended that the bonds, which were issued pursuant to 
federal legislation, were unlawful because Congress did not have the 
constitutional authority to authorize the issuance. Given this contention, 
the shareholder brought suit against the company under a state statute 
prohibiting investments in illegal securities. 
Thus, the suit was primarily a creature of state law: the shareholder 
alleged that his company violated state law. Yet the case also included 
an embedded federal question because, in order to ascertain whether the 
defendant had violated state law, the federal court needed to determine 
the constitutionality of Congress's issuance of the bonds. Thus, the 
Smith Court faced the question of whether a federal court not sitting in 
diversity could adjudicate a state-created cause of action if resolving the 
state claim required resolution of an embedded federal question. 
The Smith Court held that federal jurisdiction was appropriate. 
Borrowing from a seminal federal question case, Osborn v. Bank of 
United States, the Court held that federal jurisdiction exists if "the title 
or right set up by the party may be defeated by one construction of the 
Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite 
construction."25 Because the plaintiff's claim "depend[ed] upon the 
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States," the Court opined, "the District Court ha[d] jurisdiction under 
[the federal question statute]."26 
After Smith, one thing seemed clear: a federal question exists if 
federal law must be interpreted. This clarity, however, all but 
disappeared with the Supreme Court's next major statement on the 
matter in Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson. 
24. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
25. Jd. at 199 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,822 (1824)). 
The Court also relied on a similar but earlier statement by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia 
that "[a] case ... may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States, 
whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of either." Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (quoting 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,379 (1821)). 
26. Jd. While it is true that the Court did rely on case law reported after statutory federal 
question jurisdiction was created in 1875, it explicitly stated that the Osborn's characterization of a suit 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States has been followed in many decisions of this 
and other federal courts" and that "[t]he jurisdiction of this court is to be determined upon the principles 
laid down in the cases referred to." ld. at 201. 
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2. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson 
Merrell Dow involved a state tort claim in which the plaintiff sought 
to prove the defendant's negligence using a negligence per se theory.27 
The federal law in question was a drug-labeling regulation.28 Thus, to 
determine whether the defendant was negligent, the district judge needed 
to determine "what a federal law means," namely the labeling 
regulation. Although this question fell squarely within the rule applied 
in Smith, the Supreme Court declined to find federal question 
jurisdiction merited. The Court disclaimed any notion that its earlier 
precedents had created "some kind of automatic test" for finding federal 
jurisdiction, and instead claimed that analysis of embedded federal 
question cases required a "principled [and] pragmatic" method that 
could "accommodate[ e] [the] . . . kaleidoscopic situations" in which 
federal issues arose in state law cases.29 
In deciding against federal jurisdiction, the Court relied on the 
supposed congressional intent underlying the federal regulation at issue. 
In one portion of the opinion, the Court determined that Congress 
neither explicitly nor implicitly created a private right of action to allow 
citizen enforcement of the labeling regulation. 30 Although the plaintiff 
in Merrell Dow was relying on a state right of action, the Court deemed 
the lack of a federal right of action to be an indication by Congress that 
the agency regulation was not to be adjudicated in federal court; 
otherwise, Congress would have created a private right of action.31 
Aside from the principle of congressional intent, the Court did little to 
elucidate other guiding principles. It rejected the uniformity problems 
potentially caused by allowing state courts to interpret federallaw,32 and 
27. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). Negligence per se-a doctrine that exists in most states-permits 
plaintiffs to establish the defendant's breach of a standard of care merely by showing the defendant 
violated a statute that it had a legal duty to obey. See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS,§ 134 at 315 
(2000). 
28. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06 (stating the federal law in question was the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040). 
29. !d. at 813-14 (partially quoting Justice Cardozo's statement in Gully v. First National Bank, 
299U.S. 109, 117-18(1936)). 
30. !d. at 810--12. 
31. !d. at 814. In a sentence that would breed considerable confusion over whether a federal 
right of action was a sine qua non to obtaining federal jurisdiction in embedded federal question cases, 
the Court stated that "congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the 
violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a 
claimed violation of the statute [in a state law action should not confer federal jurisdiction]." !d. 
(emphasis added). 
32. !d. at 816. The Court explained that, "[t]o the extent that petitioner is arguing that state use 
and interpretation of the [federal statute at issue in the case] pose a threat to the order and stability of the 
[statutory] regime, petitioner should be arguing, not that federal courts should be able to review and 
2006] HYBRID LAW CASES 155 
dismissed any notion that special circumstances (such as a novel issue of 
great importance) were compelling enough to warrant jurisdiction. 33 
Thus is the majority opinion in Merrell Dow. In some respects, its 
holding is manifestly clear: congressional intent is crucial to determining 
federal jurisdiction.34 In one important respect, however-namely, 
whether Smith was still good law-the majority opm10n was 
significantly lacking. Yet when the majority opinion is viewed against 
the forcefully argued dissent of Justice Brennan, its meaning becomes 
clear. 
Justice Brennan's view, which obviously did not prevail, was that 
federal question jurisdiction should obtain where "federal law [is] an 
essential element of a state-law claim."35 For Brennan, a federal issue 
amounts to an "essential element" if the possibility exists "that the 
federal law will be incorrectly interpreted" by the state court.36 Brennan 
thus clearly favors the Smith analysis whereas the majority does not?7 
enforce state [actions involving a federal statute], but that the [federal statute] preempts state-court 
jurisdiction over the issue in dispute." !d. Additionally, the Court noted that any concerns "about the 
uniformity of interpretation" were "considerably mitigated by the fact that" the Supreme Court "retains 
power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action." !d. 
33. !d. at 817 ('"[T]he interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of 
the federal judicial system' would be ill served by a rule that made the existence of federal-question 
jurisdiction depend on the district court's case-by-case appraisal of the novelty of the federal question 
asserted as an element of the state tort.") (internal citation omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 8 (1983)). 
34. Commentators and courts, however, disputed after Merrell Dow whether the absence of a 
federal cause of action was alone fatal to federal jurisdiction, or merely militated against jurisdiction. 
Compare ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 273 (2d ed. 1994) ("Therefore, without a 
federal cause of action, a federal law cannot be the basis for federal question jurisdiction.") and Carlos 
Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1146 
n.267 (1992) (claiming that, under Merrell Dow, "federal jurisdiction may not exist under that statute if 
the federal law establishing the primary right is not enforceable through a federal right of action") with 
City of Huntsville v. City of Madison, 24 F.3d 169, 174 (II th Cir. 1994) ("We conclude that it will be 
only the exceptional federal statute that does not provide for a private remedy but still raises a federal 
question substantial enough to confer federal question jurisdiction when it is an element of a state cause 
of action.") andW. 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 
1987) ("To determine whether the court has federal question jurisdiction to decide the case, the 
complaint must contain either a federal cause of action or a state cause of action embodying a substantial 
federal question."). 
35. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828. 
36. /d. 
37. The majority's disenchantment with Smith is further revealed by its almost total failure to 
even acknowledge the case. The majority opinion in Merrell Dow cites Smith three times, two times of 
which are in footnotes. The first citation (which is in the text) merely refers to Smith as the case on 
which the district court relied in deciding the case. !d. at 806. Elsewhere, Smith is cited to explain its 
consonance with a Smith-era case that was long thought to contradict it, and to note in passing that Smith 
was the "most frequently cited case for" the notion that federal jurisdiction should exist where a state 
case "turn[s] on some construction of federal law." !d. at 804,814 nn.5, 12. 
On this issue as well, the meaning of the majority's opinion is further revealed by comparison with 
the dissent. Justice Brennan not only cites the case heavily, but actually begins his analysis with it, 
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One thing is clear after Merrell Dow: Smith is-at least in some 
important sense-no longer good law. But then came Grable & Sons. 
3. Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. 
Grable & Sons involved a state quiet title action. 38 Several years 
before filing his suit, the plaintiff had defaulted on his federal income 
taxes. As a consequence, the IRS seized his property and sold it at 
auction. Before selling the property, the IRS was required under federal 
law to give notice of the sale to the plaintiff by "giv[ing it] to the owner 
of the property [or] le[ aving it] at his usual place of abode or 
business."39 The IRS attempted to fulfill its duty to notify the plaintiff 
by sending him a certified letter. Though the plaintiff received the letter 
and had notice of the sale, he did not object to it at that time. Years 
later, however, he came to believe that the IRS was required to serve 
him personally, rather than through the mail. Accordingly, he filed a 
quiet title action in state court alleging that the current owner of the 
property (who purchased the property at the tax sale) did not have clean 
title because the sale process was flawed. The defendant removed the 
case to federal court and the plaintiff moved the court to remand the case 
to state court. The district court denied the plaintiffs motion and the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a split within the 
Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow ... always requires a federal 
cause of action as a condition for exercising federal question 
jurisdiction."40 The Court shunned a "'single, precise, all-embracing' 
test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims 
between nondiverse parties" and held that Merrell Dow does not require 
a federal cause of action.41 Rather, the existence of a federal cause of 
action for the embedded federal law is merely one issue that ought to be 
considered among a "welter of issues regarding the interrelation of 
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal 
judicial system."42 The Court stated the proper inquiry as follows: "does 
explaining that "[t]he continuing vitality of Smith is beyond challenge," especially given its affirmance 
"most recently just three Terms ago by a unanimous Court in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust." !d. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Brennan went 
on to list numerous other cases in the Supreme and circuit courts applying Smith. !d. at 820-21. 
38. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005). 
39. !d. at 2366 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a)). 
40. !d. (full case name and citation omitted). 
41. !d. at 2368 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) 
(Stevens, J. concurring). 
42. !d. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 
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a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually 
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without 
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state 
judicial responsibilities."43 
Applying this test, the Court held that federal jurisdiction was 
appropriate in this case. The Court found that the issue was 
"substantial" (though it did not use that word)44 because "[t]he 
Government ... has a direct interest in the availability of a federal 
forum to vindicate its own administrative action, and buyers (as well as 
tax delinquents) may find it valuable to come before judges used to 
federal tax matters."45 Finally, dealing with the "welter of issues" 
attendant upon federal-state relations, the Court noted that, "because it 
will be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal 
law, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax 
title provisions will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-
state division oflabor.'>'~6 
The most notable aspect of Grable & Sons is the Court's strong 
penchant for a pragmatic test. Over and over again, the Court stressed 
the need for a "'common-sense accommodation of judgment to [the] 
kaleidoscopic situations' that present a federal issue."47 Thus, the Court 
dedicated an entire section of its opinion to explaining how Merrell 
Dow--despite the clear import of the opinion's language in various 
places48--did not contain any bright-line rule. Rather, the Court 
explained that Merrell Dow held that "determinations about federal 
jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, 
judicial power, and the federal system.'>'~9 The point here is not whether 
the Court was disingenuous in its reading of Merrell Dow, but rather that 
Merrell Dow lent itself to several varying (and reasonable) 
interpretations50 and that the Court's reading of the case should be seen 
U.S. I, 8 (1983)). 
43. !d. 
44. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court explained that a "substantial" interest is one implicating 
a "serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum." !d. at 
2367. 
45. !d. at 2368. 
46. !d. 
47. !d. at 2367 (quoting Gully v. Nat'! Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936)). 
48. See Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) ("[T]he congressional 
determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is 
tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an 
element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal question jurisdiction." 
(emphasis added)). 
49. !d. at 810. 
50. Courts and commentators have disagreed on the meaning of Merrell Dow's ambiguous 
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as a choice between such interpretations. Therefore, the Court's 
selection of a flexible, pragmatic test over a bright-line rule evidences its 
strong preference for the former over the latter. 
Given this strong preference for a flexible test, the Court imbued 
surprisingly little content in the test. For an analysis the Court describes 
as "principled [and] pragmatic,"51 the Court elucidated very few 
principles and did little to describe its notion of pragmatism. For 
instance, the only guidance the Court offered for identifying a 
"substantial" federal question is to inquire whether the resolution of the 
question would benefit from "the advantages thought to be inherent in a 
federal forum"52 such as, in this case, having the question resolved by 
"judges used to federal tax matters."53 And with regard to the "welter of 
issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority,"54 the 
Court discussed only a single issue: whether federal jurisdiction will 
affect the "federal-state division of labor."55 Concluding that federal 
jurisdiction in quiet-title actions "will portend only a microscopic effect" 
on the division of labor, the Court found jurisdiction appropriate. 56 
Thus, while Grable & Sons appears to solve one problem-whether a 
federal cause of action is required for federal jurisdiction-it has 
nonetheless created a new problem-how to assess the substantiality of 
a federal law. The following Section analyzes hybrid law cases in detail 
to discern whether the cases are amenable to such an open-ended 
analysis. 
B. Substantiality Analysis in the Lower Courts 
The conventional wisdom is that embedded federal questions make up 
a "remarkably tangled comer of the law"57 that might well render a 
judge "lost in a maze."58 Yet few jurists or commentators have ventured 
into the tangled comer to study and explain it in detail.59 Such an 
holding. See supra note 34. 
51. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813. 
52. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367. 
53. /d. at 2368. 
54. /d. at 2367. 
55. /d. at 2368. 
56. /d. 
57. Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2000); see also T.B. Harms v. 
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (noting that federal question inquiry is a 
"treacherous area"). 
58. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936). 
59. The most recent scholarly effort to untangle the law in this area was Note, Mr. Smith Goes to 
Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. 
REv. 2272 (2002). While other commentators have addressed the issue over the years, see Oakley, 
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endeavor is necessary if one expects to untangle the thicket-or assess 
whether the Supreme Court's latest effort is likely to do so. Before 
solving the problem, in other words, one must know its nature. This 
Section therefore seeks to describe (1) hybrid law cases as they 
commonly arise, (2) the federal law commonly involved in the cases, 
(3) the degree of federal law interpretation often required by the cases, 
( 4) the reversal rate of district court jurisdiction decisions, (5) the rate of 
federal remand to state courts and (6) the rate of post-remand state court 
opinions on federal questions. 
Before presenting this information, a word is in order about the cases 
selected for this analysis. The universe of cases researched for this 
Article consists of almost every60 circuit court decision dealing with the 
issue published after July 8, 1986-the date when Merrell Dow was 
issued. I defined the "issue" as whether a federal question in a state 
right of action was "substantial" such that federal jurisdiction should 
obtain over the state action. Notably, this definition leaves to the side 
three common issues that often appear in jurisdictional discussions in 
hybrid claim cases.61 
1. The Context In Which of the Federal Question Appears 
Federal law in hybrid law cases generally appear~ in one of three 
contexts. First, in 16% of the hybrid law cases studied, federal law 
appeared as part of a state statute. For example, in a California case, a 
plaintiff brought suit for disability discrimination. Under a California 
statute, the disabled are protected from certain types of discrimination 
and are guaranteed "full and equal access" to various facilities. 62 In 
defining the term "full and equal access," the statute provides as follows: 
"'Full and equal access,' for purposes of this section in its application to 
transportation, means access that meets the standards of Titles II and III 
supra note 22, at 1839-43; Miller, supra note 23, at 1786-93; Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law is It, 
Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal 
Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1985), no one has delved deeply into the lower court cases to determine their 
actual nature. Instead, commentators have generally confined themselves to analyses of Supreme Court 
precedent and related theoretical considerations 
60. I say "almost every" because it is perhaps impossible to locate every opinion dealing with the 
issue. I located these opinions by searching the Westlaw database. More specifically, I shepardized 
Smith and Merrell Dow and then read each published circuit court opinion to see if the case was a hybrid 
law case involving a substantiality determination. 
61. These issues are (I) whether the federal question is "necessary" to the plaintiffs state law 
case, (2) whether the federal issue arises as a defense rather than in the plaintiffs complaint, and (3) 
whether that state cause action is completely preempted by federal law. See supra notes 21-23. 
62. CAL. C!V. CODE§ 54.1 (2006). 
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of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336)."63 
In this case, therefore, a court was called on to determine the meaning of 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. 64 
A second context in which federal law arises-comprising some 45% 
of the cases studied-is in a private contract. For example, in one case 
two parties entered into a contract for the use of a rail line. The contract 
explicitly required one party to satisfy certain operational requirements 
mandated by federal law. One issue in the case was whether the party 
had complied with these federal mandates as required by the contract. 
When called upon to decide this issue, therefore, a court necessarily had 
to refer to federallaw. 65 
In contrast to this type of case, where federal law is explicitly made a 
part of the contract, other cases involve contracts where, because the 
subject of the contract is regulated by federal law, federal law is 
implicitly a part of the contract. For example, in one case, a company 
purchased the right to a certain amount of energy output from a power 
plant. When the power plant sold several million dollars worth of 
"pollution credits" pursuant to federal regulations, the company that was 
buying the energy output sought a share of the proceeds from the credit 
sale. Because federal law assigns pollution credits to the "owner" of a 
power plant, the court in this case was called upon to determine if the 
parties' contract rendered the company a part "owner" of the power 
plant. Therefore, reference to federal law was required. 66 
Sometimes, however, a federal law is implicated not explicitly (as in 
the railroad case) or implicitly (as in the power plant case), but only 
tangentially. For example, in one case a provider of telecommunications 
services sued a buyer for breach of contract, alleging that the buyer 
failed to pay for services rendered. Because federal law requires 
telecommunications providers to file their rates with the Federal 
Communications Commission, the court in that case had to refer to these 
rates in determining if the buyer had failed to pay. 67 Other cases where 
federal law is only tangentially related to the contract include suits 
where federal law generally regulates the field to which the contract 
pertains, but does not specifically address the duties inherent in the 
63. !d. at§ 54.1(a)(3). 
64. This example is borrowed from Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858--60 (9th Cir. 2002) (suit 
under state discrimination statute required reference to Americans with Disabilities Act because state 
statute adopted certain ADA provisions verbatim). 
65. Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass'n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 
573-74 (6th Cir. 2002). 
66. Orrnet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806--07 (4th Cir. 1998). 
67. W. Union Intern., Inc. v. Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d 1494, 1495-96 (lith Cir. 1995). 
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contract. 68 
The third and final context in which federal questions appear in 
hybrid law cases is as an element of the action. Comprising about 39% 
of the hybrid law cases studied, these cases often appear as tort actions 
where the federal law defines a standard of care to be observed. For 
example, in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff argued that his 
prior prosecution under the federal RICO statute was unwarranted 
because the statute could not be construed as prohibiting his alleged 
actions. Thus, a court called upon to assess this claim had to determine 
the meaning of the RICO provision at issue.69 Other examples where 
federal law acted as a standard of care include professional malpractice 
claims where the defendant failed to follow federal law in discharging 
his or her duties/0 trespass claims where federal law controls the right of 
access to the land/1 negligence claims where federal law formed the 
basis of a negligence per se theory, 72 and claims against decisionmakers 
alleging that the decisionmakers incorrectly applied federal law.73 Still 
other claims implicate federal law in ways difficult to categorize.74 
Viewing as a whole the contexts in which federal law arises in hybrid 
law cases, one is struck by the fact that in only 16% of the cases is 
federal law relied upon to accomplish the same policy goals it was 
intended to accomplish. In 84% of the cases, on the other hand, federal 
68. See, e.g., Interstate Petrol. Corp. v. Morgan, 228 F.3d 331,335 (4th Cir. 2000) (suit alleging 
breach of gas station franchise agreement required reference to Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 
because certain franchising agreements are regulated by the Act). 
69. Berg v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422, 424-26 (9th Cir. 1994). 
70. See, e.g., Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1168--69 (4th Cir. 1996). 
71. See, e.g., Heydon v. MediaOne of Se. Mich., Inc., 327 F.3d 466, 471-72 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(trespass action against cable company required reference to federal Cable Act in order to determine 
whether company had authority to trespass); Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Co., 440 F.3d 1227, 1235-37 
(lOth Cir. 2006) (en bane) (trespass and unjust enrichment action against railroad company required 
reference to federal land grant laws in order to determine scope of railroad rights under grants). 
72. Although Merrell Dow focused on this type of case, these cases appear to be rather rare 
(perhaps because of the Merrell Dow holding). Only two such cases have been published by a circuit 
court since 1987. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chern. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151-54 (4th Cir. 
1995) (personal injury suit required reference to federal environmental regulations because plaintiff 
sought to rely on defendant's violation of regulation asperse evidence of negligence); Clark v. Velsicol 
Chern. Corp., 944 F.2d 196, 197-199 (4th Cir. 1991) (personal injury suit required reference to federal 
environmental regulations because plaintiff sought to rely on defendant's violation of regulation as per 
se evidence of negligence). 
73. See, e.g., Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 460--61 (1st Cir. 2003) (suit against local zoning 
board alleging erroneous decision by board required reference to the federal Telecommunications Act 
because Act allegedly dictated board's decision). 
74. See, e.g., D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 99-104 (2d Cir. 2001) (injurious 
falsehood claims against New York Stock Exchange for banning plaintiff from trading on exchange 
required reference to federal securities laws because laws controlled Exchange's obligations to it 
members). 
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law is used as a tool to vindicate policies different from the federal law 
itself. Thus, in the RICO case mentioned above, the RICO statute is not 
used to fight racketeering and corruption, as Congress originally 
intended, but to vindicate the policies furthered by malicious prosecution 
actions. Similarly, in the pollution credit cases discussed above, federal 
environmental law is not relied on to pursue environmental goals, but 
rather for the goal of pure financial gain (whether warranted or not).75 
Thus, notably, in the great majority of hybrid law cases, the vindication 
of federal law serves very few of the regulatory ends for which the 
federal law was adopted. 
2. The Federal Laws Appearing in Hybrid Law Cases 
Although a broad variety of federal laws appears in hybrid law cases, 
some generalizations are possible. First, only 7% of the cases (5 of 67) 
sought vindication of the plaintiffs' federal civil rights.76 Many cases-
approximately 20-30%-involve major federal regulatory statutes, such 
as the Telecommunications Act, the Cable Act, or intellectual property 
laws. 77 At times, the federal law in the hybrid case is a "law" in word 
75. It may be argued, perhaps, that one seeking to vindicate a contractual right premised on 
adherence to federal law may further the policy goals of the federal law. A party found liable for 
violating federal law-even in a breach of contract context-will be less likely to violate that federal in 
the future, thus serving the ends of the statute. While this may be true in some cases (such as in the 
farmer/landowner example presented above, see supra text accompanying note 20), it is certainly not 
true in many other contract cases. For example, in the pollution credit case (see supra text 
accompanying note 66), the dispute involved ownership of pollution credits, which is an issue somewhat 
attenuated from the goals of the statute itself. Of course, one might argue that ownership issues are core 
to the operation of the statute (because the statute permits the sale of such credits and ownership rights 
are a necessity for market forces to work). Yet, even if this argument is correct in theory, the entire 
endeavor is weakened by the principle of efficient breach. Under this principle, parties often breach 
contracts regardless of the ensuing damages because the breach will permit greater gains in a separate 
transaction. Thus, private contracts are a poor vehicle for enforcing federal law. See RICHARD A 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 4.9 at 120 (6th ed. 2003). 
76. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816--19 (4th Cir. 2004); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. 
of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 113-16 (2nd Cir. 2004); Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858--60 
(9th Cir. 2002); Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 1998); Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 
811 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1987). 
Although four additional cases involved federal civil rights laws, the suits did not seek the vindication of 
civil rights per se, but rather sought the vindication of private law rights, such as contract or tort. See 
Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (lOth Cir. 1994); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & 
Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 550-51 (8th Cir. 1996); Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (lith Cir. 
1996); Carpenter v. Wichita Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366--68 (5th Cir. 1995). For an explanation of why 
the context in which the federal law arises is important, see supra text accompanying note 75. 
77. It is difficult to classifY the cases according to the nature of the federal regulatory program 
implicated. Sometimes the cases squarely present important questions of federal regulatory programs. 
See, e.g, City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2004) (suit 
alleging breach of duty to re-negotiate telecommunications contract required reference to federal 
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only. For example, some suits sought to enforce consent decrees entered 
pursuant to federal law (whether in a federal court or agency).78 
Similarly, other cases relied on tariffs that, when filed with the 
appropriate agency, were imbued with the force offederallaw.79 
3. The Degree of Reference to Federal Law 
Regardless of the federal law involved, or the context in which it 
arises, all hybrid law cases involve at least some interpretation of federal 
law. 80 Yet the amount of interpretation involved varies greatly between 
cases. In approximately 52% of the cases, for example, federal law is 
not interpreted in any significant or meaningful way. In one such case, a 
plaintiff brought suit under a state statute prohibiting the dispensation of 
certain drugs without a prescription. The statute did not list any 
particular drug for which dispensation was prohibited, but instead 
incorporated by reference the drugs listed in a federal drug schedule. 
Thus, to determine whether the state statute was violated, the court in 
this case had to verify that drug involved in the case was in fact listed in 
the particular federal drug schedule.81 Obviously, referring to a drug 
schedule requires no interpretation and only the barest of application.82 
Even less demanding of the court's interpretational skills are cases 
that simply call for an acknowledgment of federal law. For example, in 
a suit over a licensing agreement between a Native American tribe and 
the state of California, federal law was allegedly involved simply 
because the contract was entered into pursuant to authority conferred by 
the Indian Gaming Act, but interpreting the federal law was not essential 
Telecommunications Act because statute regulated re-negotiation duties). At other times, however, the 
cases involve federal regulatory programs but do not implicate any core regulatory policies. See, e.g., 
W. Union Intern., Inc. v. Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d 1494, 1495-96 (lith Cir. 1995) (suit alleging failure 
to pay for services rendered by telecommunications required reference to federal Telecommunications 
Act because rates charged for services are regulated by tariffs filed pursuant to Act). 
78. See, e.g., Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (lOth Cir. 1994). 
79. See, e.g., W. Union Intern., Inc., 41 F.3d at 1495-96. 
80. As explained above, if federal Jaw need not be interpreted to resolve the case, dismissal is 
appropriate under Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 ( 1988). See supra note 
22. 
81. Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965,968 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing federal jurisdiction). 
82. Other examples include Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (I lth 
Cir. 2004) (a breach of contract action in which one party sought to establish the validity of a contract; 
because federal banking regulations required the contract to be in writing, the court had to determine if 
the contract was indeed in writing) and Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users 
Assoc., Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2002) (breach of contract suit for use of railroad where 
contract required one party to obtain certificates of operation from a federal agency; the court thus had 
to determine if the certificates had been properly procured). 
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for determining the outcome of the claim.83 Several other cases involve 
federal law that plays a similarly thin role. 84 
Contrary to cases requiring insignificant amounts of interpretation, 
many hybrid law cases do demand courts interpret and apply federal law 
in significant ways.85 For example, in a business disparagement action, 
a plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely (and publicly) accused it of 
selling a product for which it did not own the patent. Thus, the court 
was called upon to determine the rightful owner of the patent-a 
question that is controlled by federallaw.86 While other such cases are 
not uncommon, 87 some cases, while involving interpretation of federal 
law, do not demand an interpretation as rigorous as might be required in 
a non-hybrid law suit. For example, in a case seeking to reverse an 
arbitration award, a plaintiff alleged that the arbitrator's interpretation of 
federal law was grossly negligent. The court presented with this case 
was thus called upon not to determine exactly what federal law said, but 
simply whether the arbitrator's interpretation was grossly wrong.88 
While these cases are not especially numerous, they do comprise 
83. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1997). 
84. See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(suit to enforce a collective bargaining agreement involved federal law because collective bargaining 
agreements are creations of federal law); Milan Express Co., Inc. v. W. Surety Co., 886 F.2d 783, 786-
89 (6th Cir. 1989) (a suit by motor carrier alleging breach of shipping contract; although the Interstate 
Commerce Act regulated many aspects of shipping contracts, the plaintiff did not allege violation of 
federal law); Virgin Is. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 27 F.3d 911, 916 (3rd Cir. 1994) (a 
breach of contract suit related to a contract for the construction of public housing; although HUD 
regulations addressed many public housing issues, the plaintiff did not allege the violation of any 
regulation). 
Because federal law is simply present in these cases, and not requiring of interpretation, these cases 
should arguably be dismissed under the "necessity analysis" explained in Christianson v. Colt Industries 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). See supra note 22. One might argue, therefore, that these cases 
do not involve a "substantiality analysis" and should therefore be excluded from this study. Notably, 
however, in each case of this sort, the court purports to engage in a substantiality analysis. Thus, these 
cases-although misguided in their analysis-illustrate the nature of substantiality analysis as it is 
understood and undertaken by federal courts. As that is the central task of this study, I deem it 
appropriate to include the cases. 
85. The number of cases requiring significant interpretation is 32 of 67, or 48 percent. For a 
specific listing of these cases, see the Appendix at the end of this Article. 
86. Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. FlowData, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477-79 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (finding federal jurisdiction warranted). 
87. See, e.g., Clark v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 944 F.2d 196, 197-199 (4th Cir. 1991) (a personal 
injury action where the plaintiff sought to establish the defendant's negligence under a negligence per se 
theory; thus the court was called upon to determine whether the defendant violated an EPA regulation); 
City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2004) (a breach of 
contract suit where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached its duty to re-negotiate a 
telecommunications contract; because re-negotiation duties are partially regulated by the federal 
Telecommunications Act, the court was called upon to interpret federal law). 
88. Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 25-27 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding federal 
jurisdiction warranted). 
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approximately 16% of the cases in which significant interpretation is 
required. 89 
4. The Reversal Rate in Hybrid Law Cases 
The reversal rate for hybrid law jurisdiction decisions reflects, to 
some extent at least, the incoherence of the legal doctrine. An above 
average reversal rate is generally understood to indicate that the body of 
law involved is not sufficiently coherent to be consistently applied by 
the district courts.9° For jurisdiction questions in hybrid law cases, the 
reversal rate is 55%.91 This is significant because the reversal rate in 
civil cases (excluding habeas petitions) is 12.4%.92 Importantly, 
however, the overall reversal rate includes many cases that, on appeal, 
are subject to deferential standards of review.93 Thus, the reversal rate 
on de novo questions alone is likely higher than 12.4%. While I have 
not discovered any research addressing reversal rates according to 
89. These cases total 5 in all. See Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F.3d 857, 860-61 (8th 
Cir. 2002). (malicious prosecution action for pursuit of previous declaratory judgment suit required 
reference to a consent decree entered by a federal court because the consent decree allegedly foreclosed 
the declaratory judgment suit); U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388-91 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(malicious prosecution action required reference to federal maritime law because plaintiff alleged 
federal law did not support defendant's claims before the court); Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 25-27 (suit to 
reverse allegedly erroneous arbitration award required reference to federal law because arbitrator's 
decision was predicated in part on federal law); Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (lith Cir. 
1996) (legal malpractice claim against criminal defense attorney required reference to U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion on Eighth Amendment to determine if attorney's interpretation of case was grossly 
negligent); Berg v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422, 424-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (malicious prosecution action required 
reference to federal RICO statute in order to determine if prosecutor had legally tenable ground for 
prosecution under the law). 
90. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I, 3 (2001) (explaining that, in a category of intellectual property cases, a 
reversal rate of 33 percent is indicative of extreme doctrinal ambiguity). 
91. Another study found that jurisdictional decisions in hybrid law cases were reversed 65% of 
the time. See Note, supra note 59, at 2280. Because that study did not identify the cases used to 
calculate the reverse rate, it is impossible to explain the discrepancy. 
92. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Mar. 31,2004, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/B05Mar04.pdf. This reversal rate is consistent with past 
rates. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 70, tbl. 3.5 (1996). 
93. For example, findings of facts are often reviewed under the deferential "abuse of discretion" 
standard and arguments advanced for the first time on appeal are often reviewed under the similarly 
deferential "clear error" standard. See, e.g, Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (lOth Cir.l995) ("In 
reviewing a court's determination for abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a 
distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact."); United States v. Mitchell, 429 
F.3d 952, 961 (lOth Cir. 2005) ("Because [the defendant] did not raise this objection at the sentencing 
hearing, we review for plain error."). See also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal 
Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 517, 519 (2006) (noting in study of legal doctrine that, "when doctrine 
commanded a higher or lower level of deference to the ruling below, the circuit court's probability of 
reversal corresponded with the level of deference it was to give"). 
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standard of review, the reversal rate on hybrid law jurisdictional 
decisions is likely much higher than other cases subject to de novo 
review. That the doctrine in this area is more lacking in coherence than 
other areas is therefore a fair conclusion. 
5. The Rate of Remand 
Another interesting trait of hybrid law cases is the rate of remand. 
Whether a case is first filed in state court and then removed to federal 
court, or filed initially in federal court, the federal court will consider 
either party's motion to remand the case to state court. In hybrid law 
cases, the remand rate appears to be quite high. Specifically, of the 67 
circuit court cases studied for this Article, 66% (44 of 67 cases) were 
remanded to state court. 
6. State Decision and Publication Rate 
Once a case is remanded to state court, those courts must resolve the 
federal question in the case. A review of the cases remanded to state 
courts, however, yields little evidence that state courts are in fact 
resolving the federal questions remanded to them. Of the 44 remanded 
cases, not a single one resulted in a published decision interpreting 
federallaw. 94 
* * * 
This Part began by summarizing Supreme Court doctrine in the field 
of hybrid law jurisdiction. That summary concluded with Grable & 
Sons, wherein the Court deliberately adopted a flexible, open-ended 
approach to deciding jurisdictional questions in hybrid law cases. This 
Part then turned to a detailed analysis of hybrid law cases as they 
actually arise in the lower courts. This analysis is now used in the 
following part to demonstrate that hybrid law jurisdictional cases are 
best resolved by a bright-line rule rather than the flexible standard that 
the Supreme Court has adopted. 
94. For the purposes of this Article, I define a published decision as one that is available to the 
public on Westlaw or Lexis/Nexis, regardless of whether the opinion is designated by the state court for 
publication. My concern here is with the precedential force (or lack thereof) of state court decisions of 
federal law. Although opinions not designated for publication may not normally be cited as precedent, 
their availability may nonetheless exert a degree of precedential force inasmuch as the court evinces its 
reasoning and preferences on the legal questions involved therein. 
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Ill. RULES AND STANDARDS IN JURISDICTION OVER HYBRID LAW CASES 
Just about nobody, it seems, thinks that jurisdictional rules should be 
fuzzy. Justice William Brennan-no lightweight in the field of federal 
jurisdiction-has espoused the near-universal view that uncertain, or as 
has described them, "infinitely malleable,"95 jurisdictional rules have the 
regrettable effect of allowing "[p ]arties [to] . . . spend years litigating 
claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court 
that lacked jurisdiction."96 In a recent article on the allocation of cases 
between state and federal courts, Professor Barry Friedman concurred, 
stating that "[ o ]ne ought not make a fetish of bright line rules, but they 
have their place, and one place in particular is the law of jurisdiction."97 
Professor Martin Redish, however, has perhaps put it most forcefully. In 
a paper chastising jurisdictional rules that "resemble[] more the free-
standing, subjective, and individualized determinations of Judge Wapner 
than a coherent, generalizable jurisdictional doctrine," Professor Redish 
stated plainly that "jurisdictional uncertainty can surely lead to both a 
waste of judicial time and added expense to the litigants."98 Nor are 
Brennan, Friedman and Redish alone in their distaste for jurisdictional 
discretion; a large number of commentators seem to hold a similar 
view.99 
Yet flexibility also has its place, as David Shapiro has forcefully 
argued in his landmark article, "Jurisdiction and Discretion." According 
to Professor Shapiro, "the continued exercise of discretion ... has much 
95. Merrell Dow Pharrn. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821, n.l (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
96. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) 
97. Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal 
and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211, 1225 (2004) (arguing that a multijurisdictional approach is 
preferable to the current approach of having cases litigated in either federal or state court). 
98. Redish, supra note 21, at 1794 (criticizing "jurisdictional doctrine" as a "crazyquilt 
combination of sometimes vague and cryptic statutory directives and judge-made doctrines" and 
offering a principled approach based on seven normative factors affecting the appropriateness of a 
particular forum). 
99. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 313-14 (1950) ("the 
boundary between judicial power and nullity should also, if possible, be a bright line, so that very little 
thought is required to enable judges to keep inside of it); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND 
WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 886 (5th ed. 2003) (suggesting that the 
difficult-to-apply test of Smith may be a "game" that is not "worth the candle"); LARRY W. Y ACKLE, 
RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 91 (1994) (lamenting Supreme Court doctrine that "needlessly 
confuse[s] matters with outdated jargon and misleading generalizations" and advocating "jurisdictional 
rules that can be easily applied at the outset of litigation"); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1906 ("There 
is ... [a] strong tradition ... urging that jurisdictional rules be clear."); Note, supra note 59, at 2278 
(stating that there is a "particularly great need for clarity in articulating jurisdictional principles such as 
the scope of the Smith doctrine."). 
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to contribute to the easing of interbranch and intergovernmental 
tensions." 100 Yet Professor Shapiro's penchant for discretion is often 
overstated. Although he admirably defended the role of discretion in his 
article, he did not argue that free-ranging discretion was the final resting 
place for jurisdictional norms. Rather, he saw discretion as a means to 
an end, a tool for incrementally achieving the appropriate rule. As he 
explained: "Central to [my] thesis is the view that discretion need not 
mean incoherence, indeterminacy, or caprice; nor is discretion at odds 
with the recognition of responsibility for the adjudication of disputes. 
Rather it can lead to the development of effective guidelines and, yes, 
even rules."101 Thus, even with Shapiro's commitment to the values of 
discretion, a consensus exists that, in the long term, jurisdictional 
guidelines should be clear. 102 
Yet the underlying preference for clarity in jurisdiction has rarely 
been fully articulated or analyzed in detail. Thus, the debate over 
jurisdictional norms stands to benefit greatly from an analysis of the 
interplay of legal substance and form. The substance of a legal 
directive-such as the proper jurisdiction of federal courts-may be 
either fostered or frustrated by its form. Legal forms are generally one 
of two types: rules or standards, though many legal directives contain 
aspects of both. Although much has been written on jurisdiction and 
discretion, and a similarly large amount on rules and standards, the two 
separate concepts have yet to be applied to each other. 
This Part aims to do just that. It begins by defining rules and 
standards, then proceeds to explain the costs of each, and finally 
identifies the legal contexts in which each form would be the lowest cost 
method of resolving a legal issue. The Part then employs these 
observations to assess of the appropriate legal form for resolving 
I 00. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 545. 
I 0 I. /d. Although Shapiro recognized that a certain amount of discretion is likely unavoidable, he 
nonetheless stressed that discretion "carrie[ d] with it an obligation of reasoned and articulated 
decision ... that can therefore exist within a regime of law." Id. at 579. Jurisdictional standards, 
Shapiro explained, must be "capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by 
critics ofthe courts' work, and reviewed by the legislative branch." /d. at 578. Thus, even at its furthest 
edges, Shapiro's position on discretion still retain a significant amount of content that would constrain 
judges to a certain degree. 
For a recent exegesis of Shapiro's "Jurisdiction and Discretion" article, see Meltzer, supra note 2. In 
regard to discretion serving as a tool for achieving certainty in jurisdictional rules, Professor Meltzer 
noted that Shapiro's theory "rests on confidence that judicial elaboration of the reasons for jurisdictional 
decisions will eventually generate a body oflaw that is reasonably determinate." /d. at 1907. 
I 02. The most common objection to unclear jurisdictional guidelines is the increased costs of 
litigation. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("Parties . . . spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were 
wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction."). The analysis rarely moves beyond this rather intuitive 
observation, however. 
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jurisdictional questions in hybrid law cases. It concludes that a rule is 
preferable to a standard in such cases. 
A. Rules and Standards: Definitions and Costs 
"A 'rule' is a norm whose application turns on the presence of 
relatively noncontentious facts, and turns on the presence of those facts 
regardless [of] whether the values that the rule is designed to serve are 
actually served or disserved by the particular application."103 A 
ubiquitously proffered example of a rule is a speed limit: "Drive 65."104 
The application of this norm turns only on the speed at which someone 
drives; a person who drives in excess of 65 miles per hour violates the 
rule; a person who drives at 65 miles per hour or less obeys the rule. 
Notably, adherence to or violation of the rule does not tum on the values 
behind the rule, such as safety, or circumstances not embodied in the 
content of the rule, such as whether one is rushing to a hospital or 
driving in poor weather. Thus, rules are often described as "'opaque"' 
in the sense that they are applied without regard to the "rule's 
background justifications, and '"formal"' in the sense that they are 
"applied without regard to [the] substance of the results but only with 
regard to the rule's terms."105 
Standards, on the other hand, "are norms that have the opposite 
characteristics."106 A directive that is standard-like cannot be applied by 
its words alone, but tends to "collapse decision-making back into the 
direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact 
situation."107 Thus, while a rule instructs one to "Drive 65," a standard 
instructs one to "Drive safely." The "background principle" underlying 
a 65 mph speed limit is safety; 108 thus instructing one to "Drive safely" 
would presumably accomplish the same ends. The difference, however, 
is that the standard permits "the decision-maker to take into account all 
relevant factors," 109 such as treacherous road conditions, whereas the 
I 03. Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein 's Legal 
Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531,541 (1997). 
104. !d.; see also, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 136 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992). 
I OS. Alexander, supra note 103, at 541. 
106. /d. 
107. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 
(1992). 
l 08. There are, of course, other "background principles" that likely inform the choice of a 65 mph 
speed limit, such as fuel conservation or road maintenance costs. For the purposes of brevity and clarity, 
however, only the principle of safety is used here. 
109. See Sullivan, supra note 107, at 59. It is important to note at this juncture that the term 
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rule does not. 
Because of the differing nature of rules and standards, they each 
impose different costs when used. These costs have been studied in 
detail by numerous commentators, who widely agree as to the relative 
costs of each legal form. 110 Accordingly, a detailed tracing of each type 
and manner of cost incurred is unnecessary; instead, a listing and 
weighing of the relative costs is sufficient for the purposes of this 
Article. Thus, relative to standards, 111 rules are costly to promulgate, 112 
"decisionmaker" in the rules/standards scholarship is usually understood to simultaneously refer to two 
different entities. One is the regulated entity (the driver of a car) and the other is the enforcement entity 
(a traffic court judge). Both entities must determine for their own purposes (whether driving home from 
the store, or resolving traffic disputes) the meaning of a legal norm. Such a determination must be made 
whether the norm is a rule ("Drive 65") or a standard ("Drive safely"). "Drive 65" strongly constrains 
both the driver and the judge in deciding the appropriate speed whereas "Drive safely" permits both 
entities more leeway in determining the appropriate speed. See SCHAUER, supra note 104, at 138 (noting 
the "two types of decision-maker," one of which is the "rule-enforcer" and other of which is the 
"primary addressee of the rule"). 
110. For the leading discussions of the relative costs of rules and standards, see generally 
SCHAUER, supra note I 04; Kaplow, supra note I 04; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Sullivan, supra note I 07; Sunstein, supra note 5; Russell B. Korobkin, 
Behavior Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23 (2000). 
Some commentators contend that analyzing legal forms only according to their costs overlooks other 
important attributes of each, such as their association with different political philosophies or notions of 
individual rights. For example, in a landmark article examining rules and standards, Duncan Kennedy 
argued that particular strains of political ideology (such as altruism or individuality) lead us to prefer one 
type of legal form over the other (such as standards to further altruism, and rules to further 
individuality). Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Acljudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976). Although the insights of Professor Kennedy and others advancing non-economic 
perspectives on the issue are valuable to our understanding of legal form, they contribute comparatively 
little to the specific issue addressed in this Article. This is because § 1331 and the case law interpreting 
it do not regulate primary conduct, but rather regulate the forum for resolving disputes over primary 
conduct. For example, jurisdictional rules do not define one's right to use his or her private property, 
but do determine in which court one may seek redress for an infringement of that right. Thus, arguments 
premised on democracy and individuality (among others) carry substantially less weight in the 
jurisdictional context. 
One might reply, however, that federal jurisdiction is often a dispositive factor in the vindication of a 
substantive right. If one buys the claim of Professor Burt Neubome and others that federal judges are 
more likely to be more solicitous of civil rights claims than state judges, the choice of forum is likely to 
be quite important. See Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). Yet, in the 
particular case of embedded federal questions, this argument carries little force. Of the 67 circuit court 
opinions published since 1986 reviewed for this Article, only five sought the vindication of a federal 
civil right. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. Thus, civil rights claims comprise only a small 
portion of the issues present in embedded federal question cases. 
Ill. Because it is only possible here to speak of the costs of rules and standards in relative terms, 
one could easily rephrase this description of costs with a primary focus on standards. Thus, relative to 
rules, standards are cheap to promulgate, costly to apply and costly to research. Standards also have 
lower costs of regulatory failure, higher costs of adjudicatory failure and higher costs of primary actor 
failure. 
112. Promulgation costs are the costs of creating a rule or standard. For example, when a 
legislature wishes to use a rule to control the speed at which individuals drive, it would likely perform a 
detailed-and costly--evaluation of each of several background factors (such as traffic flow, safety and 
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cheap to apply 113 and cheap to ascertain. 114 Rules also have higher costs 
of regulatory failure, 115 lower costs of adjudicatory failure 116 and lower 
costs of primary actor failure. 117 
This cost structure makes possible the identification of the situations 
in which rules would be preferable to standards and vice versa. This 
Part now turns to the issue of making those identifications. 
B. Rules and Standards: Preferable Uses 
Given their differing natures, rules and standards are each fit for 
different situations. As explained below, the appropriateness of a rule or 
standard in a given situation hinges on (1) the frequency with which a 
legal question arises, (2) the homogeneity of the questions arising and 
(3) the resources of the actor making the decision. 
1. Frequency 
Because rules involve higher promulgation costs than standards, rules 
are preferable to standards in situations where a particular legal question 
will arise frequently. High-frequency legal questions allow the high 
promulgation costs of rules to be fully amortized over the life of the 
rule's application. Each ex ante application of a rule by the rule's 
addressee and ex post application of a rule by a judge will require less 
pollution) to choose the optimum speed for any given road. See Kaplow, supra note 104, at 579-80; 
Korobkin, supra note 110, at 31-34. 
113. Application costs are the costs of applying the rule or standard. One a rule is set defining the 
speed limit, for example, drivers, police officers and judges can easily-and cheaply-apply the rule. 
See Alexander, supra note I 03, at 542; Kaplow, supra note I 04, at 581. 
114. Research costs are the costs that litigants will spend to determine the content of a rule or 
standard. For example, a speed limit set by a rule can be discerned quite cheaply (e.g., by merely 
looking at the road sign) as compared to discerning a speed limit set by a standard. See Kaplow, supra 
note I 04, at 571. 
115. Regulatory failure costs are the costs imposed by a rule that is inartfully drafted. For 
example, the United States voting age is set at 18-years-old, even though there are many 17 -year-olds 
who are mature and educated enough to participate in government and there are many 19-year-olds who 
lack the necessary maturity and education. Thus, the voting age "rule" gets it wrong sometimes. A 
standard, on the other hand, would likely have a lower rate of over- and under-inclusion (though its cost 
of administration in this example would be extremely high). On the subject of regulatory error, see 
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 992-93; Korobkin, supra note 110, at 36; Alexander, supra note 103, at 542. 
116. Adjudicatory failure costs are the costs incurred when a judge improperly applies a rule or 
standard. Rules, because they give judges less discretion than standards, are less frequently misapplied 
than standards. See Alexander, supra note 103, at 542-43; Korobkin, supra note 110, at 38-39. 
117. Primary actor costs are the costs incurred when a primary actor fails to apply the rule 
appropriately. For example, in the case of speed limits, primary actor failure occurs when the driver 
chooses an improper speed to drive. Because rules give the primary actor less discretion, primary actor 
costs are less with rules. See Korobkin, supra note II 0, at 36-38. 
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effort compared to a standard, making the rule, over the long term, 
preferable to the standard. 118 
Again, the speed limit example is illustrative. Hundreds of millions 
of Americans drive cars every day. Determining the appropriate speed 
for each stretch of road obviously involves higher up-front costs than 
simply determining that individuals should "drive reasonably." But the 
sheer volume of decisions on speed-both ex ante by drivers ex post by 
police officers and judges-makes rule preferable to standards. 119 While 
the costs of setting an exact speed limit will initially be higher than 
adopting a reasonableness standard, the extra effort required by every 
driver and judge in determining the appropriate speed on their own will, 
over time, far exceed the up-front costs exacted by the creation of a rule. 
Importantly, inasmuch as the cost of promulgating a rule approaches 
that of promulgating a standard, the frequency of a legal question 
becomes less important. The reverse is also true; to the extent that rule-
promulgation costs greatly exceed standard-promulgation costs, the 
frequency of the legal question becomes centrally important. To 
illustrate, consider a legislative body charged with determining on which 
side of the road motorists should drive. The body could adopt either a 
rule (drive on the right side) or a standard (drive on the side reasonable 
under the circumstances). Adopting a rule in this case would cost 
scarcely more, if any, than adopting a standard. Thus, the frequency 
would take on lesser importance in the choice of legal form. On the 
other hand, in a situation where a rule would be substantially more 
costly to promulgate than a standard, such as in antitrust law, for 
example, where something akin to a standard has been chosen, 120 the ex 
post frequency of the legal question takes on exceeding importance. 
118. Korobkin, supra note 110, at 33. 
119. Other examples analogous to speed limits are easy to imagine. In the case of welfare 
entitlements, "[i]t is very hard, for example to decide who is poor, and who, among the class of poor is 
entitled to what. It would be particularly hard to decide who is poor through case-by-case judgments 
based on analogy, and even harder to make decisions about appropriate social entitlements in that 
fashion." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 97 (1996). Similarly, in the 
case of taxes, it would be wholly unworkable to have citizens and companies pay a "fair share" of taxes 
according to the government benefits received. See Alexander, supra note I 03, at 543 (noting the tax 
example); Kaplow, supra note 104, at 573 (same). For a study of rules and standards in the tax field, see 
James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. 
REv. 265, 322-23 (1995) (explaining that tax law is generally dominated by rules but that standards 
apply in rare circumstances where the regulated activity is diverse, such as capital expenditures). 
120. See 15 U.S.C. § I (2006) (prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade); see also Scalia, supra 
note II 0, at 1183 (noting that "[ o ]ne can hardly imagine a prescription more vague than the Sherman 
Act's prohibition of contracts ... in restraint of trade"). 
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2. Homogeneity 
Because rules are inflexible, they are best fit for situations in which 
the legal issue in question arises in much the same way each time. 
Where the legal issues arise differently each time, h9wever, standards 
are often preferable. 
Using the speed limit example, decisions about how fast one should 
travel, whether made by the driver or a judge, generally involve the 
same fact each time: a car, a road and a person driving to some 
destination. Accordingly, applying a rule will generate fewer 
adjudication and primary-actor failures. 121 Of course, some regulatory 
failures are inevitable, such as when one is driving to the hospital in an 
emergency. But these cases are rare in the universe of driving situations. 
The speed limit example, however, contrasts with another high-
frequency legal question: negligence cases. 122 While negligence suits 
arise regularly, thus suggesting that a rule might be preferable, the 
extraordinary variety of situations in which negligence arises-ranging 
from professional malpractice to car accidents to infliction of emotional 
distress-makes a rule inappropriate because it would generate huge 
error costs. Any attempt to reduce the multitude of appropriate 
behaviors we expect of each other to a specific rule or set of rules would 
certainly fail to account for the innumerable nuances that we all find 
relevant in determining how to behave. Thus, a rule in negligence cases 
would necessarily be broadly under- and over-inclusive, resulting in 
large costs of regulatory failure. Accordingly, even though negligence 
cases arise with high frequency, the heterogeneous circumstances from 
which they arise merit a "reasonable person" standard instead of bright-
line rule. 
3. Resources of Decisionmakers 
Where decisionmakers-including primary actors and adjudicators-
are unlikely to expend sufficient resources to apply standards, which 
take more effort to apply than rules, rules are preferable. Without the 
expenditure of sufficient resources, primary actors and judges are more 
likely to resolve legal questions incorrectly, resulting in higher error 
costs. 
121. This assumes, of course, that the rule was properly calibrated at the time it was promulgated. 
That issue, however, is not relevant to a consideration of homogeneity (or heterogeneity) dictated by the 
structure of error costs in rules and standards. 
122. See Alexander, supra note 103, at 542 (noting that "[p]erhaps 'act as would a reasonable 
person' is the closest we get to a pure standard"). 
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Before explaining this point in further detail, a couple clarifications 
are in order. The term "resources" in this Article refers to anything 
available to the decisionmaker that would assist her in resolving a 
dispute. Perhaps the most primary resource for any decisionmaker is his 
or her analytical ability. Without sufficient knowledge and intellect, 
decisionmakers will not be able to resolve legal questions. 123 Other 
resources include the time available to the decisionmaker to resolve the 
question and any personnel, such as a lawyer or clerk, upon which the 
decisionmaker may rely during the process. Another important resource 
is money. A primary actor with little disposable income is less likely to 
invest in determining the content of a standard than a rule. 124 Similarly, 
inasmuch as we, as a society, employ judges to resolve legal questions 
through standards, which require more time to apply, we will be 
required to hire more judges or pay them more. 125 
One further clarification is in order. As stated above, rules are 
appropriate where "decision makers are unlikely to expend sufficient 
resources." Two situations make this scenario likely. The first is where 
the resources are simply unavailable. The second occurs when the 
resources are available but the decisionmaker is unwilling to expend 
them because the marginal gains from the expenditure do not exceed the 
marginal costs. In the case of a primary actor, this concept is relatively 
simple to grasp. No company is likely to spend $5,000 on legal advice 
in order to avoid a possible $1,000 fine, assuming the fine is the total 
cost ofthe infraction. In the case of judges, however, the concept is a bit 
more elusive. Judges' main costs of deciding cases are time and 
analytical effort. The gains from deciding a case correctly are a bit more 
difficult to ascertain, but clearly involve aspects of personal fulfillment 
in deciding a case appropriately and fear of reversal by a higher court 
(which is essentially inapplicable to circuit courts). Given this cost and 
benefit structure of judging, commentators have observed that judges 
may be hesitant to expend their resources in applying standards because 
"adjudicators will often determine that the marginal administrative costs 
of applying a standard precisely, rather than haphazardly, based on its 
underlying principles will not always exceed the marginal benefit of 
doing so."126 Thus, summarizing these clarifications, decisionmakers' 
123. SCHAUER, supra note I 04, at 229 (noting the importance of "mental capacity" and opining, 
in the context of standards, that "none of us, ordinary or not, have the mental capacity incessantly to 
consider all of the things that an 'all things considered' decision-making model requires of us"). 
124. See Kaplow, supra note 104, at 571. 
125. In theory, judges may balk at work that they might otherwise accept if they were paid an 
annual salary of$300,000 instead of$150,000. Salary is a commonly understood drawback to a federal 
judgeship. 
126. Korobkin, supra note 110, at 38; Kaplow, supra note 104, at 595 (stating that "it is sensible 
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resources, i.e., analytical ability, time, help from others, and money, as 
well as their willingness to expend the resources, are relevant to the 
choice of form. 
As in many other instances, the speed limit example illustrates why 
resources should be evaluated in choosing the appropriate legal form. A 
strict "Drive 65" rule takes very few resources to apply; it merely 
requires the decisionmaker-driver or judge-to assess the speed of a 
vehicle. This assessment requires relatively little brain power, time, or 
money and is not likely to exact marginal costs greater than marginal 
benefits. A standard, such as "Drive Reasonably", however, demands 
much more from the decisionmaker. 127 She must have knowledge of 
driving and the ability to analyze the many factors that inform the 
reasonableness standard. If the decisionmaker does not have such 
ability, and likewise has few alternative resources, i.e., time, help, 
money, the likelihood of an incorrect result is higher. 
An analogy imagined by Larry Alexander perhaps illustrates the 
importance of analytical ability more clearly. 
A useful analogy is that of following a cookbook [i.e., following a 
rule] versus acting like a master chef [i.e., following a standard]. 
Cookbook recipes do not capture precisely what a master chef would do. 
Because most of us are not master chefs, however, we do better-come 
closer to what master chefs would do-if we follow the cookbook than if 
we try to emulate master chefs. 
Rules are the cookbook approach to achieving the Good and the Right. 
Standards are the master chef approach. Those who favor rules are 
somewhat pessimistic about the abilities of those who must decide under 
norms. Those who favor standards are optimists and picture 
decisionmakers as master chefs. 128 
Thus, to the degree decisionmakers have the analytical expertise and 
the willingness to decide multi-factorial, standard-based matters, 
standards will not increase the error rate significantly. 129 However, to 
to oversimplify greatly" when one is faced with applying a standard to a situation that will, in all 
likelihood, never come before the decisionmaker again); SCHAUER, supra note 104, at 229 (explaining 
that even if we are not "paralysed by [the] uncertainty [of standards], and stumble into numerous errors 
just because we have too little time to consider too much, we often simplify our thought processes, using 
a form of decision-making that limits us to the consideration of a manageable array of factors"). 
127. See SCHAUER, supra note 104, at 229-30 (noting that rules are easier to apply than 
standards); Kaplow, supra note 104, at 570 (stating that the costs of adjudication is "greater if a standard 
governs because the adjudication will also require giving content to the standard"). 
128. Alexander, supra note 103, at 543. 
129. Regardless of the resources of a decisionmaker (or willingness to expend them) a certain 
systemic error rate will always exist in standard-based cases. See Korobkin, supra note 110, at 38 
("Some economic analysts recognize that adjudicators will sometimes fail to draw the legal boundary [of 
a standard] optimally."). Of course, rule-based adjudication will itself involve at least some systemic 
176 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
the degree that one doubts that the analytical ability of decisionmakers is 
sufficient to task at hand, a rule would be preferable to a standard. 
C. The Appropriate Legal Form for Deciding 
Jurisdictional Questions in Hybrid Law Cases 
In Grable & Sons, the Supreme Court rejected a rule-based approach 
for deciding whether federal jurisdiction should lie in suits involving 
embedded federal questions. The Court explained that a "'single, 
precise, all-embracing"'130 test was inappropriate because such a test 
could not account for the "'welter of issues regarding the interrelation of 
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal 
judicial system. "'131 The Court here is referring to the costs of 
adjudication failure and while such costs are relevant to the decision, the 
Court erred in failing to consider the many other categories of costs 
attendant upon rules and standards. The Court seems oblivious to the 
fact that standards will impose costs on the system as well. Only 
through comparing the two sets of costs can one determine the 
appropriate legal form. This section does just that. It applies the criteria 
identified above to the specific jurisdictional questions faced by judges 
in embedded federal question cases and concludes that a rule is 
preferable to a standard in making jurisdictional decisions in these cases. 
1. Frequency 
As explained above, when a legal issue arises with relative frequency, 
rules are preferable to standards. The example of a frequently-arising 
legal question presented above was speeding. Given this example, one 
might think that jurisdictional questions in hybrid law cases lie at the 
opposite end of the spectrum. This, however, would be an exaggeration. 
Although only 67 published circuit court opinions from 1987 through 
2005 addressed federal jurisdiction in embedded federal question cases, 
this number represents merely the tip of the iceberg. 132 That published 
amount of error, though it is likely less than standard-based adjudication. In any event, I leave to side in 
this Article the likely small percentage of errors that will result even in cases of unlimited resources. 
130. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005) 
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
131. !d. at 2367 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 
463 U.S. I, 28 (1983)). 
132. Moreover, there are likely more than 67 published circuit court opinions on this issue. As 
explained above, see supra note 60, these cases were located by searching the Westlaw database for 
published circuit cases citing Smith or Merrell Dow. It is likely that some courts-though admittedly, 
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opinions constitute only a small minority of all issued opinions is well 
established. Nationally, the federal publication rate sits at about only 
20%133 and seems to be decreasing every year. 134 At the district court 
level, the number of embedded federal question cases increases 
dramatically. While this Article does not calculate the number of 
published district court opinions, the civil appeal rate-which sits at 
about 9%-provides a rough estimate of the number of cases decided in 
the district courts. 135 Extrapolating from the publication and appeal rate, 
one can conclude that district courts handled approximately 3,700 such 
cases over that past two decades. 136 Yet even the district court cases do 
not account for the entire number of embedded federal questions. As 
not likely very many-resolved the jurisdictional question without citing either of these cases. Some 
courts may have simply cited Franchise Tax Board or no case at all. 
Opinions that do not cite any precedent or only cite Franchise Tax Board, but yet deal with the 
jurisdictional issues in this Article, are exceedingly difficult to track down. If a court fails to cite any 
case in its analysis, one may only find the case through Boolean searches on Westlaw or Lexis, which is 
often a haphazard method of finding cases. While looking for cases that cite Franchise Tax Board eases 
the search somewhat, it is still onerous because Franchise Tax Board is often cited for several different 
propositions, the main one of which is the well-pleaded complaint rule. Thus, a search of cases that cite 
Franchise Tax Board that do not also cite Smith or Merrell Dow turns up over 800 cases within the date 
range used in this Article. Most of these cases will not involve the question of federal jurisdiction over 
embedded federal questions, but it is likely that at least a couple do. With sufficient resources, this 
batch of cases could be read and would likely yield several additional cases. However, given the rather 
modest number of cases that would be uncovered, as well as the onerous amount of work required, these 
cases were not reviewed. 
133. See Keith H. Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
I, 7 (1989) (finding, inter alia, that 80.7 percent of the Sixth Circuit's decisions went unpublished in 
1987); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 189 (1999) 
(finding that, nationally, 78.9 percent of appellate decisions went unpublished in 1995 and 1996 and 
that, in the Fourth Circuit, that rate was as high as 90.3 percent); David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. 
Schwarz, The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1133 (2002) ("[A]ppellate judges designate 
for exclusion from the Federal Reporter approximately 80% of the opinions they write.") 
134. Publication rates seem to be a factor of judicial resources and caseloads. If caseloads 
increase at greater rate than judgeships, as has happened in the past decade, publication rates are like to 
fall. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 133, at 1141-42 (2002) (noting the connection between 
caseload, judgeships and publication rates); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, 
Publication, And Asylum Law In The Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005) (noting that the 
"proportion [of unpublished to published opinions] continues to rise as caseloads increase"). 
135. See Carol Krafka, Joe S. Cecil & Patricia Lombard, Stalking The Increase In The Rate Of 
Federal Civil Appeals, 18 JUST. Svs. J. 233, 244 (1996). Although some have calculated the civil appeal 
rate somewhat higher, see Michael Abramowicz, En Bane Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1609 
n.38 (2000) (finding appeals rates in circuits to range between I 0.3 percent and 18.6 percent), these 
figures are skewed by prisoner and federal civil rights appeals. According to researchers at the Federal 
Judicial Center, when one ignores these classes of high-appeal of cases, "the relationship between 
appeals and district court terminations [has remained] steady through the years, with approximately 8.6 
appeals filed for every 100 district court terminations." Krafka, 18 JUST. Svs. J. at 244. Because 
prisoner cases rarely involve an embedded federal question and federal civil rights cases never do, the 9 
percent appeal rate is a more accurate figure than the overall rate. 
136. To reach this estimate, I multiplied the number of published opinions (67) by the inverse of 
the publication rate ( 1/.2) by the inverse of the appeal rate ( 1/.09). This calculation yielded 3, 722 cases. 
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explained above, two types of decisionmakers operate in the judicial 
system; one is the judge, and the other is the primary actor. For every 
jurisdictional decision made by a district court, certainly many more 
such decisions are made by litigants prior to filing. Thus, the frequency 
of jurisdictional questions involving an embedded federal question is 
likely considerably higher than the 3,700 questions calculated above. 
Admittedly, these estimates are not built on hard empirics. Possibly, 
for example, the publication rate on hybrid law questions is much higher 
than in other areas of law and the total number of hybrid law cases is 
therefore actually much lower than this Article's rough estimate. Yet 
even if the frequency of these cases is significantly lower than this 
estimate, the frequency factor still suggests that a rule is preferable to a 
standard. As explained above, to the extent that rules and standards 
have similar promulgation costs, the frequency factor becomes less 
significant in choosing between the two forms. 137 This, in fact, is likely 
the case here. 
The similarity of promulgation costs in this instance is mainly 
attributable to the institutional nature of the Supreme Court. When the 
Court chooses a rule or standard for a particular area oflaw, its members 
and clerks chiefly rely on case briefs (including those submitted by the 
parties as well as amici), prior case law, academic writings, and any 
other literature bearing on the issue in the case. When faced with a 
difficult legal question, such as one involving the Clean Air Act for 
example, the Supreme Court does not commission its own study of the 
issue as the EPA might do. Given the Court's method of deciding 
cases-cases that, under the principle of stare decisis, amount to a legal 
directive-the costs involved are chiefly the costs of labor, such as 
clerks and other staff; operational costs, such as Westlaw subscriptions 
and building maintenance costs; and the justices' personal opportunity 
costs. Importantly, these costs (with the exception of opportunity costs) 
are all "sunk"; that is, regardless of the effort expended on each case, the 
costs will remain constant and cannot be recouped. Thus, regardless of 
whether the Court labors intensely on a particular issue in order to 
promulgate a rule, or works less hard in adopting a standard, the 
promulgation costs will be essentially identical. 
Moreover, even if costs were not sunk and instead varied with the 
amount of effort expended on a particular case, rule-promulgation likely 
does not require significantly more effort by the Court than standard-
promulgation. Consider the example of Miranda v. Arizona, in which 
the Court promulgated a bright-line rule on the issue of custodial 
137. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
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interrogations. 138 Prior to Miranda, the voluntariness of a confession 
was determined using a totality of the circumstances standard. How 
much "effort" the Court put into crafting its bright-line rule is 
impossible to know, but a safe surmise is that the effort expended was 
likely similar to the effort that would have been required by a standard. 
Therefore, given that the promulgation costs of rules and standards 
are likely similar in the Supreme Court and that the jurisdictional 
question presented by hybrid law cases are not as rare as often thought, 
the frequency factor suggests that a rule is preferable to a standard on 
this issue. 
2. Homogeneity 
According to the legend promulgated by the Supreme Court, hybrid 
law cases arise in a "kaleidoscopic [range ofJ situations."139 At first 
glance, the Supreme Court's claim of heterogeneity is understandable. 
Embedded federal questions do arise in a broad variety of cases. There 
are contract actions that implicate the Clean Water Act, 140 tort actions 
that involve federal land grant statutes, 141 malicious prosecution claims 
predicated in part on federal maritime law, 142 and state statutory claims 
related to the American with Disabilities Act, 143 to name just a few. In 
this sense, the cases are heterogeneous because they involve a variety of 
different subject matters. Yet a different-and more appropriate-way 
exists to assess the heterogeneity of these cases. Seen in this different 
perspective, the cases are not heterogeneous at all but are in fact 
homogeneous. This alternate perspective involves imagining how the 
Supreme Court would decide each case if it considered them one at a 
time. If, despite the heterogeneous facts, most jurisdictional questions 
were decided the same way-i.e., cases were sent mostly to state court 
or mostly to federal court-then the cases as a whole, seen through a 
jurisdictional lens, are rather homogenous. As explained below, hybrid 
138. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
139. Every single Supreme Court decision on this issue in the modem era has paid tribute to 
Justice Cardozo's proclamation in Gully v. First Nat'/ Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936) 
that embedded federal question cases arise in "kaleidoscopic situations." See Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988); Dow Pharm. v .. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986); Franchise Tax 
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 20 (1983). 
140. Templeton Bd. of Sewer Comm'rs. v. Am. Tissue Mills of Mass., 352 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
141. Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Co., 318 F.3d 1231, 1236-38 (lOth Cir. 2003). 
142. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2002). 
143. Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280 (lith Cir. 1998). 
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law cases are in fact rather homogenous with respect to jurisdictional 
considerations, making a rule preferable to a standard on this factor. 
What are the components of this jurisdictional lens? They are factors 
used by courts and scholars to assign cases to either state or federal 
courts, or both. While these factors are familiar to most who have 
studied the issue, this Article pauses here to present them. Afterwards, 
the Article applies them to several hybrid law cases and concludes that 
the cases, though varied in terms of the facts and law involved, are 
generally homogenous in terms of the jurisdictional considerations. 
a. The factors relevant to the allocation of 
cases between state and federal courts 
In defining the scope of federal question jurisdiction, jurists and 
scholars typically consider several factors. Among these factors are the 
following (1) the purposes behind federal question jurisdiction, which 
include guarding against state hostility to federal law or interests, taking 
advantage of federal expertise on matters of federal law, and developing 
relative uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law; 144 
(2) a sovereign's interest in applying its own law; and (3) the possible 
benefits of interjurisdictional dialogue. 145 These factors are each briefly 
144. Though federal jurisdiction scholars are in general agreement as to why federal question 
jurisdiction is needed, there is nonetheless disagreement on the number and/or organization of reasons 
supporting federal question jurisdiction. See Doemberg, supra note 21, at 64 7 (finding that federal 
question jurisdiction exists for two reasons: "the fear of state hostility to federal laws and the need for 
uniformity in their interpretation and application"); Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with 
Statutory Federal Question Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1495-96 (1991) (listing four reasons for 
federal question jurisdiction: "(I) an expertise in discerning and interpreting federal interests, (2) a 
sympathetic, but respectful, national perspective, (3) the potential for uniform interpretation of federal 
law, and (4) the impartiality and confidence afforded by independence"); Thomas B. Marvell, The 
Rationales for Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 5 
WIS. L. REV. 1315 (1984) (listing three rationales for federal question jurisdiction: "sympathy with 
federal law," "expertise" and "uniformity"). 
In this Article, I rely on three factors chiefly because they are the factors most commonly cited and 
also the ones the Supreme Court relied on in Grable. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 ("(A] federal 
court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless tum on substantial 
questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that 
a federal forum offers on federal issues."). To be sure, I have doubts that federal question jurisdiction 
does indeed serve these ends. See John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 2007) (arguing that neither uniformity nor 
state hostility should be used to assess federal question jurisdiction issues). 
145. This list of factors is by no means exhaustive. Martin Redish, for example, has developed 
seven factors to consider in setting up a system of federal jurisdiction. Redish, supra note 21, at 1772-
87. While I borrow several of his factors, I leave others out, primarily because his goal was to identify 
all the factors one must consider in establishing an entire jurisdictional system from scratch. Because 
the issue in this Article relates primarily to federal question jurisdiction, some of his considerations are 
inapplicable. For instance, one of his factors is "institutionalism" which he describes as a concern over 
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described below. 146 
State Hostility. The notion that states might be hostile to federal laws 
or interests pre-dates the Constitution. In Federalist No. 80, for instance, 
Alexander Hamilton explained that federal law would not be 
"scrupulously regarded" by the states because they would be possessed 
of an intense self-interest. 147 Half a century later, state hostility played a 
major-though unstated-role in Osborn v. Bank of United States, a 
seminal case on federal question jurisdiction.148 Yet the United States is 
no longer the country it was in 1824. It is significantly more unified 
and, although states occasionally grumble about federal intrusion into 
which institution will establish the rules of jurisdiction. !d. at 1783-84. Because I assume for purposes 
of this Article that the Supreme Court has the authority to define federal court jurisdiction through a 
reasonable interpretation of 28 U .S.C. § 1331, I deem it unnecessary to consider this factor. Another 
factor I leave to the side is litigation efficiency, which Redish connects with joinder and pendant 
jurisdiction. See id. at 1778-79. These considerations likewise lie beyond the scope of this Article. 
Other of Redish's factors, I consider in a different context. For instance, his concern over "fundamental 
fairness" (which he describes as the concern that a litigant appear before a forum that is unbiased), I 
consider in the context of federal question jurisdiction-as it is one of the purposes behind the 
jurisdictional grant. !d. at I 779-82. Similarly, Redish's concern over litigant interests (which is shared 
by other commentators, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 302-06 (1988)) is unnecessary to discuss because the litigant interests 
mainly relate to their choice of forum, which they invoke according to their understanding of hostilities 
and expertise, both of which I discuss in terms of the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. !d. at 
1775-78. 
146. One factor that I do not discuss, but which is sometimes discussed in case allocation, is the 
caseload of the federal judiciary. According to some commentators, because overcrowded dockets 
affect courts' ability to mete out justice, caseloads should be "an accepted factor in judicial decision-
making." POSNER, supra note 92, at 314-19. Other commentators, however, insist that "[t]he federal 
courts do not exist for the purpose of clearing their dockets, ... [but to] interpret and enforce federal 
law ... [and if] the commitment of significant resources is required to accomplish this goal, then so be 
it." See Redish, supra note 21, at 1786. 
While a comprehensive analysis of the case load rationale is beyond the scope of this Article, I note 
here some initial skepticism of analyzing federal caseloads to define the contours of federal question 
jurisdiction. While legal pragmatism-a theory that would justify the analysis of caseloads in these 
situations-has much to say about federal jurisdiction, it is not clear that the baldly pragmatic analysis 
of case loads is appropriate here. Nonetheless, even if such pragmatism were justified, it is certainly a 
less important factor than the others. Thus, its use or non-use is not likely to affect the analysis in this 
Article. 
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
148. 22 U.S. 738 (1824). The role of state hostility is revealed in Justice Johnson's dissent in 
Osborn. See id. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating that the "policy of the decision is obvious," 
namely to "render[] all the protection necessary, that the general government can give to this Bank") 
Years later, Justice Frankfurter made the same observation. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Marshall's holding [in Osborn] was 
undoubtedly influenced by his fear that the bank might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts that 
could not be remedied by an appeal on an isolated federal question."); see also James E. Pfander, Article 
I Tribunals, Article III Courts, And The Judicial Power Of The United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 
713 n.314 (2004) ("Osborn itself grew out of a perception that federal instrumentalities may need 
protection from hostile state officers and state court judges who would otherwise adjudicate common 
law claims."). 
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state affairs, pervasive regulation by the federal government is the 
widely-accepted norm. Thus, both courts and commentators have 
claimed that the notion of state hostility to federal law is outdated and 
unrealistic. 149 Although some still maintain that federal courts are more 
solicitous of civil rights than state courts, 150 few studies have confirmed 
this 151 and many seem to have disproved it. 152 Still others doubt that the 
149. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (refusing to intervene in state proceedings in 
part because states can be trusted to reach the right result); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 517 (I 976) 
(refusing to recognize federal habeas claims premised on Fourth Amendment violations in part because 
of an "unwilling[ness] to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to 
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States"); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("It is generally to be assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe 
constitutional limitations as expounded by this Court, and that the mere possibility of erroneous initial 
application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to 
justifY a disruption of orderly state proceedings."); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 440 
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that "no one could reasonably think that the judges of 
Wisconsin have less fidelity to due process requirements of the Federal Constitution than we do"); 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richmond Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1955) (refusing to 
allow injunction of state court proceedings) ("The assumption upon which the argument proceeds is that 
federal rights will not be adequately protected in the state courts, and the 'gap' complained of is 
impatience with the appellate process if state courts go wrong. But during more than half of our history 
Congress, in establishing the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, in the main relied on the adequacy 
of the state judicial systems to enforce federal rights, subject to review by this Court .... We cannot 
assume that this confidence has been misplaced."); In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 
(1975) (refusing "to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their 
constitutional responsibilities"); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act 
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 69-70 (1923) ("[T]here is now little danger that the State court will not 
amply protect persons claiming Federal rights.") 
150. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 110; Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 
n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although this concern [over state hostility] may be less 
compelling today than it once was, the American Law Institute reported as recently as 1969 that 'it is 
difficult to avoid concluding that federal courts are more likely to apply federal law sympathetically and 
understandingly than are state courts."') (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF 
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969)). For an analysis of the ways in which 
parity affects jurisdictional issues, see Chemerinsky, supra note 145, at 239-55. 
151. See Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, 
and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1221-22 (1997); Andrew Gelman, et al., A 
Broken System, The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, I J. 
EMPIRCAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 230-31 (2004); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 5 WIS. L. REV. 1315 (1984) 
(finding that, of 267 attorneys surveyed in student rights cases, most preferred to file in federal court); 
Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum in Removal Cases under Diversity and Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369,428 (1992) (finding that 50.7 percent of defense attorneys and 26.3 
percent of plaintiff's attorneys cited local bias as the reason for removal to federal court). 
152. MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE 
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 34-62 (1999) (examining empirical evidence on parity and 
arguing that it demonstrates that claims of federal rights are equally likely to be upheld in state court and 
federal court); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 232-46 (1983) 
(claiming that empirical evidence supports a finding of parity between state and federal courts with 
respect to enforcement of federal rights); Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical 
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thesis is empirically testable. 153 
Expertise. Federal expertise in the field of federal law is another 
reason often advanced for federal question jurisdiction. Although this 
factor was not an original reason for vesting federal courts with 
jurisdiction to interpret federal law (the first Article III courts, of course, 
began without any experience in federal law whatsoever), it has become 
a widely proffered reason for § 1331 jurisdiction. In a report titled 
"Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal 
Courts," the American Law Institute explained that "[t]he federal courts 
have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and 
application of federal law which would be lost if federal question cases 
were given to the state courts."154 More recently, Judge Guido Calabresi 
of the Second Circuit boldly declared that state judges "are not experts 
on federal law and, with great respect to them, they are not good at 
it." 155 The Supreme Court as well has endorsed this theory, most 
particularly in Grable & Sons itself. 156 
Uniformity. The final reason typically proffered for federal question 
jurisdiction is to promote the uniform interpretation of federal law. On 
this matter as well, Alexander Hamilton was the first to explain the 
rationale in detail, stating that "[t]hirteen independent courts of final 
Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 233,285 (1999) (concluding that there is "strong evidence of 
parity in the takings area"); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth a/Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 
(1999) (concluding, with respect to gay rights, that state courts may be as solicitous (or more) than 
federal courts); DANIEL PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 109-16 (2003) (stating that state 
courts were more hospitable to gay rights and federal courts); See Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. 
Martinek, State Court Decision Making in Confession Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109 (2002) (analyzing 661 
state court confession cases and concluding that state courts generally complied with federal supreme 
court precedent). 
153. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 3 (1980) ("There are, to my knowledge, no statistical data to support the assertion that 
federal courts are, on the whole, better equipped to guard federal interests than their state counterparts. 
Indeed, it would be difficult to devise a system of measurement which could be used to answer that 
question empirically."); LARRY W. Y ACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1999) ("The question does not lend 
itself to empirical testing."); Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 145 at 256 ("[F]ocusing on parity is futile 
because ultimately the issue of parity is an empirical question for which no empirical measure is 
possible."). 
154. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note !50, at 164-65 (1969). 
155. Guido Calabresi, Federal And State Courts: Restoring A Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1293, 1304 (2003) ("'We are federal judges, we have more knowledge of federal law. You are 
state judges, you have more knowledge of state law. Let each of us do our job and not be insulted."'); 
see also Kurland, supra note I, at 487 ("I start with the principle that the federal courts are the primary 
experts on national law just as the State courts are the final expositors of the laws of their respective 
jurisdictions."); Friedman, supra note 97, 1236-37. 
156. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005) 
(noting that the federal government and litigants "may find it valuable to come before judges used to 
federal tax matters"). 
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jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra 
in government from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can 
proceed."157 In the more-than-two-hundred years since Hamilton's 
statement of the uniformity principle, numerous courts158 and 
commentators159 have concurred with his view. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court noted at the outset of Grable & Sons that the "hope for 
uniformity" in the interpretation of federal law should partially define 
the contours of§ 1331 jurisdiction. 160 Although some have questioned 
the view that federal court jurisdiction will result in greater uniformity 
than state court jurisdiction, 161 the principle nonetheless remains firmly 
established in the law of federal jurisdiction. 
Sovereignty Interests. Courts and commentators widely agree that a 
sovereign, whether a state government or the federal government, should 
have primary authority to decide cases involving its own laws. "The 
reason for the rule is that only the courts of the sovereign (and 
particularly the sovereign's highest court) can render an authoritative 
interpretation of that sovereign's laws."162 Thus, a jurisdictional rule 
should ensure that, as a general matter, state courts decide questions of 
state law and federal courts decide questions of federal law. Of course, 
federal diversity jurisdiction belies this claim. 163 While that is true, the 
jurisdictional grant is premised on the notion that state court biases 
against foreigners are a greater ill than the federal interpretation of state 
law. The fact of the matter remains, however, that federal interpretation 
of state law has "the potential to create a variety of problems, from the 
157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
158. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (stating that the "rules of 
international Jaw should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations"); Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304,347-48 (1816) (federal jurisdiction is required because without it, federal 
law "would be different in different states" and may "never have precisely the same construction, 
obligation, or efficacy, in any two states"); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) 
(noting that concern over the uniformity of federal Jaw counsels in favor of the creation of federal 
common Jaw). 
159. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158 
(1953) (noting that federal jurisdiction is key to "achieving widespread, uniform effectuation of federal 
law"). 
160. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368 ("[A] federal court ought to be able to hear claims 
recognized under state Jaw that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justif'y 
resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal 
issues."). 
161. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2, 266 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that 
"[ o ]n a controversial issue, there are likely to be two or three different positions adopted among thirteen 
federal courts of appeals" and that "[ e ]ven if all fifty state judiciaries consider the issue, there still are 
likely to be just two or three different positions on a given legal question"). 
162. Friedman, supra note 97, at 1237. 
163. 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (2006). 
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minor to the chaotic" and the same can be said of state interpretation of 
federallaw. 164 
Interjurisdictional Dialogue. Another factor to consider in allocating 
cases between state and federal courts is the extent to which either 
sovereign might benefit from having the courts of another sovereign 
apply its law. Commonly referred to as "cross pollination," the idea 
captures the hope, and occasional reality, that a federal court may be 
able to help develop state law, or that a state court may be able to help 
develop federal law. The assistance stems from a sovereign's fresh view 
of the law in question. There is a dialogic quality to this factor; it relies 
on different sovereigns' having different perspectives on a particular 
law, and on an assumption that more perspectives generally lead to a 
better substantive result. 165 David Shapiro has argued, for example, that 
states have benefited from federal court interpretation of their laws. 166 
Other commentators have generally agreed. 167 
Of course, the presumed benefits of cross pollination seem to conflict 
with the sovereignty interests identified above. In permitting federal 
courts to "cross pollinate" state laws, federal jurisdiction-at least to 
some extent-supplants states as sovereigns. If the ability to define its 
own law is part of what makes a sovereign "sovereign," then cross 
pollination can only have a delegitimizing effect. The problem is 
164. Friedman, supra note 97, at 1238; see also Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views 
Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1677-79 (1992) 
(explaining the effects of diversity jurisdiction on state law); Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the 
Power of Federal Courts to CertifY Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1672, 1674 n.3 (2003) 
(listing instances where federal courts have erroneously interpreted state law and noting the sometimes 
long delay before such interpretations are rectified by state courts). 
165. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 
87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1465 (characterizing cross pollination as a type of"dialog"). 
Of course, this is not always true, as one can imagine that sometimes there are "too many cooks in 
the kitchen" to accomplish a desired task. In the context of federal-state cross pollination, however, 
there are only two "cooks" in the kitchen and the likelihood for conflict is significantly reduced. 
166. David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
317,325 (1977). 
167. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 16-17 (1985) (noting the 
contribution of foreign jurisdictions to the development of one jurisdiction's laws); William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 367, 386 (1980) (same); Schapiro, supra note 165, at 1467 (noting that "territorial or systemic 
boundaries need not disqualify a court from making a valuable contribution to the ongoing interpretive 
exercise"); Redish, supra note 21, at 1773 (noting that "intersystemic cross-pollination" is one of seven 
factors to consider if one were to set up a jurisdictional system from scratch); Shapiro, supra note 166, at 
324-27 (noting federal court contribution to development of state law); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, 
Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 325-26 (1994) (discussing 
notion that "federal court ascertainment of state law, even if subsequently proven wrong, has a positive, 
normative effect on the development of state law"); Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: 
Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1505--06, n.ll6 (1987) (discussing the 
usefulness of having multiple interpreters of federal law). 
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particularly acute where a novel state law question is involved. In such 
situations, the benefits from cross pollination by a federal court are 
likely smaller than the costs of a potential misstatement of state law. 168 
Moreover, with respect to a novel legal question, the federal decision 
would carry no authority. 169 On the other hand, where a state law is 
settled or a novel state law may implicate federal statutory or 
constitutional issues, the costs of cross pollination are likely low and the 
new perspective on the law may prove helpful. 170 
Thus, in allocating cases between federal and state courts, 
interjurisdictional dialogue is worthy of consideration inasmuch as cases 
call for one sovereign to assist the other in handling cases premised on 
settled law. Inasmuch as unsettled questions of law are involved, 
however, interjurisdictional dialogue is an inappropriate consideration. 
b. The homogeneity of hybrid law cases 
from a jurisdictional perspective 
Although hybrid law cases involve a variety of different facts and 
federal laws, and thus might be considered heterogeneous, when one 
views them according to the factors relevant to federal jurisdiction 
decisions, they are in reality quite similar. 
State Hostility. Among the hybrid law cases analyzed for this Article, 
the amount of expected state hostility to the federal laws embedded 
within state suits is roughly similar. More specifically, in the great 
majority of cases, there is little reason to expect hostility. As described 
above, the majority of hybrid law cases involve only insignificant 
168. See Friedman, supra note 97, at 1240. This principle is recognized through state certification 
statutes, which roughly mimic the principle (though not procedure) established in R.R. Comm'n of Tex. 
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4248 (2d ed. 1988 and Supp. 1996) (explaining that most states now have 
certification statutes). Using this tool, federal courts are permitted to certify novel state law questions to 
state high courts. Although certification is rather commonplace today, some have called for its 
increased usage. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997); Calabresi, supra 
note 155, at 1301 (stating that, on the question of avoiding the ills of diversity jurisdiction, the "answer 
is ... [to] certify, certify, certify"). 
169. See Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying Power of the State Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation, 61 Mo. L. 
REv. 508, 510 (2002) (noting that, except where federal law affects the outcome, it is 
"axiomatic ... [that] a state's highest court is the final, authoritative expositor of a state's statutory and 
constitutional law"); Friedman, supra note 97, at 1239-40 ("No matter how clever, original, or even 
persuasive a federal court's interpretation of state law is, it is not authoritative."). 
170. Shapiro, supra note 166, at 325-26 (stating that federal judges serve the states by "setting 
[federal] statutory or constitutional boundaries"); Friedman, supra note 97, at 1239 (citing Shapiro and 
noting that "setting (federal) statutory or constitutional boundaries ... is precisely what federal judges 
should do"). 
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interpretations of federal law. 171 It is difficult to see how a state court 
can express hostility to federal law, for example, by referring to a federal 
drug schedule to see if a certain drug is listed there, 172 or by determining 
whether a written contract complies with a federal law requiring banking 
contacts to be written. 173 Although a certain number of hybrid law cases 
do involve the actual interpretation and application of federal law, little 
reason exists to expect hostility in many of these cases. The fear of state 
hostility to federal law has typically been linked to civil rights cases174 
and, among the hybrid law cases requiring federal law to be interpreted, 
very few are civil rights cases.175 
State courts could plausibly harbor hostility for federal laws that 
intrude upon the state regulatory sphere. Federal telecommunications or 
environmental laws might fall into this category. 176 These cases, 
however, represent a small minority of hybrid law cases. 177 Thus, when 
viewed as a whole, hybrid law cases are generally quite similar with 
respect the amount of expected state hostility. 
Expertise. At first glance, hybrid law cases would seem to be uniform 
in their need for expertise in the interpretation of federal law. After all, 
each case, by definition, involves a federal law, and would therefore 
profit equally from federal expertise. This uniformity, however, does 
not hold true for two reasons. First, as already noted, the majority of 
hybrid law cases do not call for any meaningful interpretation of federal 
law. Second, the cases that do call for an interpretation of federal law 
vary in the complexity of the federal law involved. While some cases 
involve rather simple and straightforward federal laws, others involve 
complex laws such as the Telecommunications Act, ERISA, and 
environmental statutes. 
I 71. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
172. Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) (suit under state statute prohibiting 
dispensation of certain drugs without prescription required reference to federal regulations because state 
statute applied to drugs listed in the federal regulation). 
173. Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 FJd 1285, 1291-93 (lith Cir. 2004) (suit alleging 
breach of contract related to formation of internet bank required reference to federal banking regulations 
because said regulations required contract to be in writing). 
174. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 76 (noting that only 5 out of 67 hybrid law cases seek to 
vindicate federal civil rights). 
176. See, e.g., City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir. 
2004) (suit alleging breach of duty to re-negotiate telecommunications contract required reference to 
federal Telecommunications Act because statute regulated re-negotiation duties). 
177. Moreover, such federal laws are not always intrusive of state authority. The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, specifically gives states a role in controlling the 
administration of the Act within their respective jurisdictions. See 4 7 U .S.C. § 252 (2006) (granting state 
utility commissions authority to contracts between local carriers). 
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The homogeneity of hybrid law cases with respect to the importance 
of expertise in federal law is thus a difficult judgment call. While the 
majority of cases considered for this Article would not likely profit from 
federal expertise, a significant number of cases would benefit. The 
difficulty, of course, is quantifying this number so as to determine, on 
the whole, whether hybrid law cases are generally homogeneous or 
heterogeneous. As it turns out, this difficult task is not necessary 
because the other four factors used to assess the homogeneity of hybrid 
law cases from a jurisdictional perspective cut decidedly in favor of 
homogeneity. 
Uniformity. Hybrid law cases all implicate the concern for uniformity 
in much the same way, which is to say almost not at all. As an initial 
matter, uniformity becomes an issue only when federal law is 
interpreted, which, as explained above, occurs in a minority of hybrid 
law cases. Among the cases that do involve interpretation of federal 
law, however, the concern for uniformity is infinitesimal because state 
courts rarely publish their interpretations of federal law. As explained 
above, of the 67 hybrid law cases studied for this Article, 44 were 
remanded to state court. Of those remanded to state court, not a single 
one resulted in a published opinion interpreting federal law. Either of 
two reasons might cause this result. First, the state court did not 
interpret the federal law for some reason, such as because the parties 
settled or because the case was resolvable without referring to federal 
law. Where federal law is not interpreted, uniformity of federal law is 
obviously not a concern. Second, the state court interpreted the federal 
law but did not publish its opinion. An unpublished opinion certainly 
cannot breed disuniformity, for it will never be used as precedent in 
successive cases. 178 
Thus, because many hybrid law cases do not call for the interpretation 
of federal law, and the cases that do call for an interpretation rarely 
result in published opinions, hybrid law cases are exceedingly 
homogenous in how they implicate uniformity concerns. 
Sovereignty Interests. By definition, all hybrid law cases involve 
state and federal law. Thus, all hybrid law cases implicate the 
sovereignty interests of states and the federal government. This is not to 
say, of course, that the sovereignty interests of each sovereign are 
roughly equal. As explained below, state interests are almost always 
greater than the federal interests. Rather, it is to say that the conflict 
between state and federal interests is roughly similar in most hybrid law 
178. As noted above, I define an "unpublished" opinion as any opinion not available through 
LexisNexis or Westlaw. See supra note 94. 
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cases. 
Most hybrid law cases implicate state sovereignty interests 
significantly and federal sovereignty interests only minimally. The 
famous hybrid law case of Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust-which 
tested a major Congressional program and turned solely on a federal 
constitutional issue-is an outlier on the spectrum of hybrid law cases. 
Most hybrid cases are mainly creatures of state law and implicate federal 
law only tangentially. For example, breach of contract suits typically 
focus (as one might expect) on the rights and duties of the parties under 
the contract as interpreted under state law and involve federal law only 
inasmuch as federal law regulates the field of commerce generally, or 
the specific contract in particular. 179 In very few cases is federal law the 
only disputed portion of the case. 
Therefore, with respect to sovereignty interests, hybrid law cases look 
quite similar. They generally implicate state interests significantly and 
federal interests minimally, if at all. 
Interjurisdictional Dialogue. The importance of dialogue between 
state and federal courts applies with similar force in most hybrid law 
cases. The typical hybrid law case calls for the interpretation of a 
significant amount of state law and a small amount of federal law. As 
noted above, federal law occasionally appears in a case more 
prominently than usual. This does not mean, however, that the value of 
interjurisdictional dialogue is different in these cases; rather, it suggests 
that the sovereign likely to profit from the dialogue will differ. 180 If a 
federal court hears a case involving significant amounts of settled state 
law, a state is likely to benefit somewhat from the federal view of its 
laws. In the opposite situation, where a case involves significant 
amounts of settled federal law, the federal government is likely to 
benefit to some degree from a state opinion. 
Notably, the hybrid law cases studied for this Article did not involve 
novel questions of state or federal law. Were novel questions, whether 
of state or federal law, appearing routinely, but not uniformly, in hybrid 
law cases, the interjurisdictional dialogue principle might apply with 
varying force. As explained above, inasmuch as interjurisdictional 
179. See e.g.. AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (breach of contract suit 
by banks against insurance companies required reference to the federal Bank Secrecy Act because the 
federal statute regulated portions of parties obligations relevant to the Joss event); Interstate Petrol. Corp. 
v. Morgan, 228 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (suit alleging breach of gas station franchise agreement 
required reference to Petroleum Marketing Practices Act because certain franchising agreements are 
regulated by the Act). 
180. Put another way, interjurisdictional dialogue is a jurisdiction-neutral principle. It does not 
prefer state jurisdiction over federal, or vice versa. Instead, it merely prefers that each jurisdiction 
benefit from potential dialogue with the other. 
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dialogue impinges upon principles of sovereignty, it is thought to yield 
in cases where the interests of the sovereign are at their highest, such as 
in cases involving novel questions of law. Because hybrid law cases 
rarely involve novel questions of law, the interjurisdictional dialogue 
principle generally applies with similar force along the spectrum of 
hybrid law cases. 
* * * 
To summarize this section, hybrid law cases are generally 
homogenous when viewed according the jurisdictional principles 
applicable to allocating federal question cases between state and federal 
court. First, state hostility to federal law applies to the great majority of 
hybrid law cases in much the same way. Second, although the majority 
of cases would benefit equally from federal expertise, a significant 
number would benefit to a different degree. This lack of homogeneity, 
however, is overcome by the other three factors discussed-namely 
uniformity, sovereignty interests and interjurisdictional dialogue. Each 
of these principles applies with similar force in hybrid law cases. 
Therefore, hybrid law cases are, on the whole, quite homogenous. The 
Article now turns to the resources of decisionmakers, another factor that 
bears on the choice between rules and standards. 
3. Resources of Decisionrnakers 
As explained above, rules are preferable to standards where 
decisionrnakers are unlikely to expend the additional resources to 
resolve a standard. Decisionmakers are unlikely to expend the extra 
resources for one of two reasons: they either do not have the resources, 
or the marginal gains from the expenditure do not exceed the marginal 
costs. Thus, in choosing between a rule and a standard for dealing with 
hybrid law cases, the question is one of whether resources are so scarce 
among decisionrnakers that the interpretation of a standard (as opposed 
to a rule) will lie beyond their means or whether the marginal benefits of 
interpreting standards are likely less than the marginal costs. 
Both of these questions present almost insurmountable empirical 
problems. Ascertaining the resources litigants might bring to bear on 
hybrid law cases or any of the marginal benefits they would expect to 
receive from such suits is nearly impossible. Though ascertaining the 
same information for judges is difficult, one significant difference makes 
this determination easier: Judges leave evidence of their decisions, i.e., 
their judicial opinions. Although one must be careful not to infer too 
much from such opinions, some general conclusions present themselves 
on the issue of the expenditure of resources. 
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For judges, the most important resource is their mental ability. 181 
Judges with exceptional analytical abilities-those Larry Alexander 
would call "master chefs"-will likely be equipped to apply legal 
standards. On the other hand, judges lacking such abilities-those 
Alexander would simply call line cooks-will more likely find standards 
challenging to apply, thus resulting in a higher error rate. In considering 
the resources of judges then, the question becomes whether the federal 
judiciary is made up of master chefs or line cooks. Given the widely-
held view that federal judges are cut from a finer judicial cloth, 182 one 
might expect there to be far more chefs than cooks. Yet, on the issue of 
discretion in hybrid law cases, Professor Daniel Meltzer offers notable 
dissent from this view. In a recent article, he asked whether "the men 
and women who comprise the federal bench have been or will be able to 
craft a sufficiently determinate body of doctrine by following the 
[discretionary] approach [Professor David] Shapiro proposes."183 
Speaking specifically on the issue of jurisdiction in hybrid law cases, 
Meltzer opined that "Shapiro may at times be just a little too sanguine" 
about the workability of a discretion-conferring standard, as opposed to 
a discretion-constraining rule. 184 Thus, after having read a substantial 
number of lower court opinions, he expressed "doubt[]" as to "whether 
federal judges, as intelligent and dedicated as most of them are, can in 
fact establish a coherent framework for the boundaries of subject matter 
jurisdiction predicated ... upon a federal ingredient in a state law claim 
for relief."185 He suggested that academics, such as Shapiro, who have 
analyzed the issue are "experts in a way that generalist federal judges are 
not."186 "Academics are unusually good analysts," Meltzer explained, 
and often "have a taste, as a matter of professional inclination, for 
complexity."187 
181. The availability of other resources-such as time and money-generally does not constrain 
judges. While judges might prefer to have extra money so as to hire more clerks, judges do have the 
luxury of time. In the great majority of cases, there is no deadline before which they must issue an 
opinion. Opinions that are not finished today can generally be finished tomorrow, or the next day, or the 
next month. In this sense, the truism that "time is money" applies with force to judging. That is, time is 
a abundant resource that compensates for any monetary constraints. 
182. See Neuborne, supra note 110, at 1121 (claiming that a "competence gap exists between the 
state and federal courts"). 
183. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1911. 
184. /d. at 1912. 
185. /d. at 1913. 
186. /d. at 1911 (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 885, 888 (2003) as support for this proposition). 
187. !d. (citing Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 
DUKE L.J. I, 34--38 (1992) as support for this proposition). Professor Meltzer was quick to add that 
"[m)any academics ... are entirely lacking in other qualities necessary to be a good judge." /d. 
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Thus, judicial opinions in hybrid law cases suggest, to some extent at 
least, that federal judges may not be sufficiently competent to apply a 
standard. A more empirical method exists for assessing this contention, 
however. The reversal rate in hybrid law cases is roughly four times the 
rate of reversal for all civil cases. 188 While one must be careful not to 
infer too much from this fact, 189 this high reversal rate suggests that, for 
one reason or another, federal judges may not be investing the analytical 
effort necessary to resolve hybrid law jurisdiction questions that they 
invest on many other legal questions. 190 
* * * 
Using guidelines developed in Part III.C for choosing between a rule 
and standard, this section sought to determine whether a rule or standard 
is preferable in resolving jurisdiction questions in hybrid law cases. As 
established above, such questions arise with significant frequency, are 
generally homogenous with respect to jurisdictional principles, and, for 
whatever reason, do not seem to elicit adequate analyses from the 
district courts. Accordingly, a rule is preferable to a standard on this 
issue. Having established the preferability of a rule over a standard for 
hybrid law cases, the Article now turns to the appropriate jurisdictional 
rule in hybrid law cases. 
IV. THE PROPER RULE IN HYBRID LAW CASES 
Unlike the choice between a rule and standard-which was based on 
an analysis of the costs of promulgation and application of each legal 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93. 
189. For a variety of reasons, the reversal rate in hybrid law cases may be artificially high 
compared to similar cases. Nonetheless, the rate is still likely higher than the average reversal rate. See 
supra text accompanying notes 90-93. 
190. One might argue that the reversal rate is high not because judges fail to put in enough effort, 
but because the Merrell Dow doctrine was confusing and therefore more difficult to apply than other 
doctrines. It follows, the argument goes, that now that the confusion created by Merrell Dow has been 
cleared by Grable & Sons, the reversal rate should decrease. This argument, while plausible to a certain 
degree, is nonetheless belied by the fact that many courts read Merrell Dow to create a bright-line rule. 
See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing numerous cases holding that 
"[u]nder Merrell Dow ... 'if federal law does not provide a private right of action, then a state law 
action based on its violation perforce does not raise a substantial federal question"') (quoting Utley v. 
Varian Assoc., Inc. 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.I987). Moreover, even if Merrell Dow did not create a 
strict rule, its standard was nowhere near as broad as that adopted in Grable & Sons. See Grable & Sons 
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005) (instructing courts to determine 
federal question jurisdiction over hybrid law cases by considering the "welter of issues regarding the 
interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system"). 
Thus, while Grable & Sons clarified some of the confusion surrounding Merrell Dow, it did not replace 
it with a clearly defined standard. It is not at all clear, therefore, that the reversal rate in these cases will 
decrease. 
2006] HYBRID LAW CASES 193 
form-the choice between alternative rules turns on substantive 
considerations about the allocation of power between the states and the 
federal judiciary. 191 This enterprise necessarily admits of the 
congressional purposes behind federal question jurisdiction, but also 
accounts for other factors that courts and scholars have traditionally 
found compelling in drawing jurisdictional lines. In fact, the 
considerations employed in this section are those that the Court endorsed 
in Grable & Sons, albeit somewhat indirectly. 192 
This Part identifies the appropriate rule in hybrid law jurisdictional 
191. One might think that, because federal question jurisdiction is controlled by statute, the proper 
analysis in this circumstance should be one solely of statutory interpretation. Yet, the Supreme Court's 
decisions on federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 have never been efforts at statutory 
interpretation. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 24 ("Congress's intent [in enacting § 1331] has had little 
or nothing to do with the Court's decisions concerning what constitutes a federal question."). For 
example, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 ( 1908), the Court adopted the well-
pleaded complaint rule-a rule effectively excluding large numbers of cases presenting a federal 
question. Other cases-most notably Grable & Sons-exemplifY the same point. See, e.g., Merrell 
Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. 2363; Moore v. Chesapeake 
& Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-215 (1934); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508 
(1900). Of course, an established pattern of ignoring the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not give one 
license to ignore it in the future. Yet, because the phrase "arising under" does not admit of an obvious 
meaning, courts must resort to underlying principles when seeking to give content to the statute. 
Therefore, in keeping with this observation as well as Supreme Court precedent on the matter, the 
contours of jurisdiction in this instance will be determined with reference to the principles underlying 
federal jurisdiction. 
Moreover, numerous scholars in this field have taken the same approach-focusing on principles, 
purposes and logic instead of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 97, at 1216 ("A 
central task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between state and federal courts."); Paul 
M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 622 
( 1981) ("[State and federal courts] will continue to be partners in the task of defining and enforcing 
federal constitutional principles. The question remains as to where to draw the lines; but line-drawing is 
the correct enterprise."); Redish, supra note 21, at 1772-87 (discussing seven factors relevant to 
determining the proper allocation of judicial power between the states and the federal government); 
Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of 
Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 625 (1991) (stating that "the challenge [of allocating cases 
between state and federal court]lies in finding a principled means of identifying those cases that belong 
in federal court"); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 506 (1928) ("[T]he proper allocation of authority between United States 
and state courts is but part of the perennial concern over the wise distribution of power between the 
states and the nation."). 
192. In its opinion, the Court first noted that the purposes of federal question jurisdiction were 
relevant to its decision. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 ("[A] federal court ought to be able to 
hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and 
thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on 
federal issues."). The Court later noted that the "welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal 
and state authority" should be considered as well. While the Court did not specifically enumerate these 
"issues," it later took into account factors such as respect for state sovereignty and litigant choice. !d. at 
2368-69 (stating that federal interests in federal tax law will be promoted, state interests in applying 
their own law would not be greatly diminished, and that litigants may prefer to have access to the 
expertise of a federal judge). 
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cases. It does this by first determining the courts in which hybrid law 
cases are best adjudicated. A comparison of the characteristics of hybrid 
law cases to the purposes underlying federal question jurisdiction 
reveals that hybrid law cases, in general, do not implicate the purposes 
behind federal question jurisdiction and thus belong in state courts. 
Having established that hybrid law cases generally belong in state 
courts, this Part then crafts a rule that, when applied, will allocate the 
majority of hybrid law cases to the state courts. The appropriate rule for 
accomplishing this allocation is the "cause-of-action test." That is, 
federal question jurisdiction should obtain only in cases where a federal 
cause of action supports the federal law implicated by the plaintiffs 
complaint. 
A. The Proper Courts to Adjudicate Hybrid Law Cases 
To determine where hybrid law cases are best adjudicated, one must 
compare their characteristics with the purposes underlying federal 
question jurisdiction. If hybrid law cases implicate the purposes of 
federal question jurisdiction, then the cases should be adjudicated in 
federal court. If the cases do not implicate those interests, however, the 
state courts should adjudicate the cases. 
As explained above, the reasons for asserting federal jurisdiction are 
(1) the need to protect federal law from state hostility, 193 (2) the 
importance of federal expertise in resolving federal questions, 194 (3) the 
need for uniformity in the interpretation of federal law, 195 ( 4) the 
sovereignty interests of the states and federal governmene96 and (5) the 
benefits of interjurisdictional dialogue. 197 This section now views 
hybrid law cases in light of these principles. 
State Hostility. The prospect that states might be inhospitable to 
federal laws or interests is insignificant in hybrid law cases for several 
reasons. First, as described above, the majority of hybrid law cases 
involve only a ministerial application of federal law or no application of 
federal law at all. 198 As noted above, state courts will have difficulty 
expressing hostility to federal law, for example, by referring to a federal 
drug schedule, 199 or by determining whether a contract is in writing as 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 147-153. 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 154-156. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 157-161. 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 162-164. 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 165-167. 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
199. Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) (suit under state statute prohibiting 
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required by federal law.Z00 Moreover, the cases that do involve 
interpretation of federal law are generally not cases where hostility is 
thought to be most likely-that is, civil rights cases.201 
State hostility, however, is not always confined to civil rights and 
states might foreseeably resent federal intrusion into state regulatory 
domains through telecommunications or environmental laws, for 
example. This potential for hostility presents only a small risk to federal 
interests for three reasons. First, no evidence of state hostility exists in 
any hybrid law cases remanded to state court. Out of the 44 cases 
remanded to state court, not a single one was resolved with a published 
opinion addressing the federal question. While state courts may 
possibly vent their hostility to federal law in unpublished opinions, the 
absence of even a single published opinion suggests that risk of hostility 
in this area is more imagined than real. 202 
The second reason why hostility in this category of cases presents 
little concern is that, should a state assume a contrarian position, the 
United States Supreme Court can always take jurisdiction and reverse 
the state court's holding.203 Although the Court's ability to superintend 
the state courts is highly limited,204 the potential for such review serves 
as at least some disincentive for state courts to flout federal law. 
Moreover, should a state court decision violate federal law on an 
important national policy matter, such as telecommunications or 
environmental law, studies have shown the Supreme Court is much 
more likely to grant certiorari, especially where the state decision 
conflicts with other lower court decisions or Supreme Court 
dispensation of certain drugs without prescription required reference to federal regulations because state 
statute applied to drugs listed in the federal regulation). 
200. Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (lith Cir. 2004) (suit alleging 
breach of contract related to formation of internet bank required reference to federal banking regulations 
because said regulations required contract to be in writing). 
20 I. See supra text accompanying note 76 (identifYing the 5 of 67 hybrid law cases seeking to 
vindicate civil rights). 
202. One might even hypothesize that a state court having hostility for federal law might prefer to 
publish its opinion. Published opinions, because of their precedential force, would be more likely to 
advance the hostile objectives than an unpublished opinion. 
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) (granting the Supreme Court the authority, but not the 
obligation, to review state high court decisions involving federal questions). 
204. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 
58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 737,739,743 (2001) (noting the Court's decrease in docket size from an about 
150 cases prior to the 1980s to between 70-80 currently); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: 
Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1704-13 (2000) 
(noting the plenary discretion afforded to the Supreme Court to decline appellate jurisdiction); Michael 
E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 
335, 336, 350 (2002) (noting the shrinking case load of the Supreme Court and its effect on state court 
decisions, especially at a time when lower federal dockets are expanding). 
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precedent. 205 
Third, while one must be careful not to overstate the Supreme Court's 
ability to mollify state hostility, one must also be careful not to overstate 
the concept of state hostility itself. As noted above, the fear of state 
disobedience that made federal question jurisdiction appropriate in 1787 
is much less compelling in today's era, where pervasive federal 
regulation is an accepted norm. 206 
Thus, although the potential for state hostility exists if state courts are 
to decide the federal questions in hybrid law cases, this hostility is likely 
to be quite limited, if existent at all. 
Expertise. Hybrid law cases do not typically demand expertise in 
federal law. As discussed in Part II.B above, the majority of hybrid law 
cases involve little or no interpretation of federal law. Little expertise is 
needed, for example, to determine if a party to a contract has fulfilled his 
contractual duty to obtain federal regulatory approval for a rate 
increase.207 In other cases, such as a suit over a contract to build a 
public housing facility that was generally regulated by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, no interpretation of federal law is 
required.208 Even cases that require actual interpretation and application 
of federal law rarely involve significant analytical challenges. For 
example, in malicious prosecution or professional malpractice cases-
which comprise 16% of cases requiring the interpretation of federal 
law-the reviewing court need not determine the precise contours of 
federal law, but need only determine whether the defendant's 
interpretation oflaw was grossly incorrect.209 
205. See Solimine, supra note 204, at 359 (noting "available evidence seems to indicate that the 
Supreme Court has been able, to a tolerable degree, to cany out the monitoring function [of state 
courts]" and that "compelling evidence" indicates that the Court usually reviews cases of significant 
political or social importance). For studies indicating that the Court is likely to review a case where 
conflict among courts exists, see Gregory A. Caldiera & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and 
Agenda Setting in the U.S Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1109, 1120 (1988), S. Sidney Ulmer, 
Conflict with Supreme Court Precedents and the Granting of Plenary Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474-77 
(1983) (concluding that that the Court is more likely to grant certiorari in cases where the holding 
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions: 
Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 901,906-11 (1984) (finding a relationship 
between the grant of certiorari and the existence of intercircuit conflict or conflict with Supreme Court 
precedent). 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 171-177. 
207. Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Assoc., Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 
573-74 (6th Cir. 2002) (suit alleging breach of railroad contract required reference to federal railroad 
laws because contract required party to obtain certificates of operation issued pursuant to federal 
statute). 
208. Virgin Is. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 27 F.3d 911, 916 (3rd Cir. 1994) (suit 
alleging breach of contract to build public housing required reference to HUD regulations because 
contracts were covered under such regulations). 
209. See supra cases cited in note 89. 
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Of course, certain cases will benefit from federal expertise. Examples 
include suits involving major federal regulatory regimes, such as the 
Telecommunications Act210 or the Clean Air Act. 211 State judges will 
likely be less familiar with these and other similar statutes than federal 
judges. This weakness, however, is not compelling for four reasons. 
First, these cases represent a small minority of the whole. Thus, the loss 
of expertise will occur only in isolated cases. Second, the lack of 
expertise is likely to have deleterious impacts only on issues of first 
impression. Where federal precedent exists in either the U.S. Supreme 
Court or lower federal courts, state courts often follow federal 
precedent.212 Third, even if a state court were faced with an issue of first 
impression or departed from federal precedent, having the state court 
decide the issue still has value. Numerous commentators have observed 
that state courts can contribute effectively to the development of federal 
law.213 Fourth, because these types of cases, i.e., cases involving large 
federal regulatory regimes, are typically imbued with important public 
interests, the Supreme Court is more likely to review them.214 
Thus, although state review of embedded federal questions will 
sacrifice some federal expertise, this sacrifice, on the whole, will be 
quite small. Therefore, state court jurisdiction over hybrid cases is 
preferable on the issue of expertise. 215 
210. See, e.g., Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458,460--61 (1st Cir. 2003) (suit against local zoning 
board alleging erroneous decision by board required reference to the federal Telecommunications Act 
because Act allegedly dictated board's decision). 
211. See, e.g., Orrnet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1996) (breach of 
contract suit by power plant licensee alleging right to federal pollution credits required reference to EPA 
regulations because regulations defined who an "owner" was for purposes of pollution credits). 
212. See Preis, supra note 144, at Part JJI.A.2 (presenting empirical evidence suggesting state 
courts rely on federal precedent in 58% of the cases involving federal questions). 
213. See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review Of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study 
In Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 897 (1985) (stating that state courts often can "make 
contributions to the development of federal law when given the opportunity"); Robert F. Utter, 
Swimming In The Jaws Of The Crocodile: State Court Comment On Federal Constitutional Issues When 
Disposing Of Cases On State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1025, 1030-41 (noting a variety 
of ways in which "[s]tate courts have made a valuable contribution to the analysis and development of 
federal constitutional law."). 
214. See Caldiera & Wright, supra note 205, at 1119, 1122 (demonstrating with statistical analysis 
that the number of amicus briefs filed in favor of certiorari-a presumed indicator of the public interest 
in the legal issue-is positively correlated with the likelihood of Supreme Court review). 
215. One might query why state expertise in state law is not equally important as federal expertise 
in federal law. Because hybrid law cases implicitly involve both state and federal law, one might think 
that state expertise would be relevant as well. This, however, ignores the Supremacy Clause and its 
import in the constitutional system. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is superior to state law. 
And by extension, the correct interpretation of federal law has greater importance than the correct 
interpretation of state law. Thus, when setting the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, federal expertise 
overrides state expertise. 
This is not to say, however, that all state interests must bow to federal needs. To the contrary, there 
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Uniformity. Relegating hybrid law cases to the state courts will not 
result in significant or persistent disuniformity of federal law for five 
reasons. First, as explained above, the majority of hybrid law cases do 
not call for any meaningful interpretation of federal law. Where little or 
no interpretation is necessary, little or no disuniformity will result. 
Second, even if concern exists over the minority of cases requiring 
interpretation of federal law, state courts are likely to apply settled 
federal law where it is extant.216 Third, out of the 44 hybrid cases 
remanded to state courts, not a single one resulted in a published 
decision reaching the merits of the federal question. Thus, even if state 
courts were to erroneously decide federal questions after remand, the 
failure to publish them will eliminate any threatened disuniformity. 
Fourth, inasmuch as some disuniformity is created, the likelihood of 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court increases, thereby reducing the 
likelihood that the disuniformity will persist.217 Fifth and finally, 
because hybrid law disputes can arise between diverse parties as well as 
non-diverse parties, federal jurisdiction may still be asserted over the 
federal question at some future time. Thus, while state jurisdiction over 
hybrid law cases may result in a temporary disuniformity, as the federal 
issue continues to arise between diverse parties, federal courts will have 
the opportunity to clarify and unify the federal law. In this way, 
disuniformity is not a permanent defect, but a temporary disequilibrium. 
Sovereignty Interests. In hybrid law cases, state interests figure more 
prominently than federal interests because the federal question is usually 
a single, non-dispositive issue embedded within a multitude of state law 
issues. For example, many cases are similar to Dunlap v. G&L Holding 
Group, Inc., which involved a host of complicated state law contractual 
issues.218 Federal jurisdiction was alleged on the ground that federal law 
required one of the contracts to be in writing, which it clearly was, and 
that the court would therefore have to apply federal law to determine the 
validity of the contract. While technically true, the magnitude of the 
federal issue-both in terms of complexity and importance to the case-
paled in comparison to the state law issues. Notably rare in hybrid law 
cases is the situation presented in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, 
where the federal issue was of great magnitude and constituted the only 
issue disputed in the case. 
is near universal agreement among scholars that states are entitled to the rights of any sovereign, namely 
the presumptive right to apply their own laws in their own courts. See supra text accompanying notes 
162-164. 
216. See, e.g., Preis, supra note 144, at Part JII.A.2. 
217. See supra sources cited in note 205. 
218. 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (I lth Cir. 2004). 
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Put simply, hybrid law cases almost always involve more state law 
than federal law. Thus, the sovereignty interests of the states are, on the 
whole, greater. 
Interjurisdictional Dialogue. As previously noted, the notion that a 
sovereign might profit from another sovereign's interpretation of its 
laws is in some conflict with the principle that a sovereign should have 
primary authority to interpret its own laws.219 Thus emerges the general 
rule that interjurisdictional dialogue is wise where settled law is 
concerned, but unwise where issues of first impression are concerned. 
As already noted, hybrid law cases are made up mostly of state law 
issues and a small amount of federal law. Given this composition, one 
might think that states therefore have the most to gain from federal input 
on state laws. In this same respect, however, state courts may also have 
the most to lose. Because issues of first impression are more likely to 
appear among the copious state issues in hybrid law cases and less likely 
to appear in the comparatively few federal issues, many of which are 
essentially non-issues anyway, states may suffer a higher rate of 
intrusion into their sovereignty. 
In the end, the importance of dialogue in the allocation of hybrid law 
cases depends on the relative values of dialogue and sovereignty. If 
sovereignty is highly valued, interjurisdictional dialogue is unlikely to 
compel federal jurisdiction over hybrid law cases. If, on the other hand, 
dialogue is considered paramount, the occasional federal interpretation 
of novel state law issues will not greatly offend sovereignty interests. 
Although pinpointing the relative values of these two interests is 
impossible, the sovereignty interests likely surpass dialogue interests. 
Sovereignty interests occupy the heartland of case allocation decisions 
while dialogue interests, although valuable to some extent, lie to the 
edge. Where the two conflict, therefore, sovereignty interests should 
prevail. Accordingly, the principle of interjurisdictional dialogue likely 
falls in favor of state court jurisdiction in hybrid law cases. 
* * * 
Thus, viewing hybrid law cases against the five factors mentmg 
federal jurisdiction, one sees that these cases are properly heard in the 
state courts. The cases (1) raise little concern of state hostility, 
(2) require only a small need for federal expertise, (3) present little risk 
of disuniformity, ( 4) implicate stronger state sovereignty interests than 
federal sovereignty interests, and (5) would not benefit from dialogue to 
a degree that would outweigh costs to sovereignty interests. 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 162-164. 
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B. The Rule for Allocating Hybrid Law Cases to State Courts 
Given that hybrid law cases are best adjudicated in state courts, the 
question becomes: What rule will allocate the cases to these courts? 
Two rules-and only two rules-are possible. 220 
First, federal courts might hold that a case presents a federal question 
only when the case is predicated entirely on federal law. That is, cases 
that involve both federal and state law are not cases that "arise under" 
federal law. While such a rule would accomplish the allocation goal, it 
would undoubtedly run afoul of the federal question statute. A case 
does not cease to arise under a federal law simply because a state law 
question is also involved. One might argue in response that the well-
pleaded complaint rule operates with similar arbitrariness and is an 
accepted jurisdictional rule (notwithstanding its criticisms).221 Yet the 
well-pleaded complaint rule is based on at least a somewhat plausible 
interpretation of § 1331; that is, a case arises under federal law when 
federal law gives rise to the plaintiffs claim.222 A rule precluding 
jurisdiction over a federal question simply because a state law question 
is also present in the complaint cannot be justified in any similar way. 
Thus, a rule requiring that federal question cases be devoid of state law 
issues would not be a proper rule. 223 
A second alternative would be to allow federal courts to assert 
jurisdiction over hybrid law cases where the federal law implicated in 
the suit was supported by a federal cause of action. The great majority 
of hybrid law cases studied in this Article did not involve a federal cause 
of action; thus, this rule would properly allocate the cases to state court 
most of the time. 224 Moreover, the cause of action test also clears the 
220. Perhaps I lack imagination on this point, but task of allocating hybrid law cases mostly to 
state courts with a rule seems to admit of only two possible rules. As explained in greater detail in the 
following paragraphs, the cases must either all be relegated to state courts or be allowed in federal courts 
only. 
221. See supra note 21. 
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
223. Moreover, such a rule would be in considerable tension with the holding of Osborn v. Bank 
of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824). There, the Court held that a state law replevin 
action nonetheless arose under federal law because federal law formed an "ingredient" in the state law 
claim. !d. While Osborn involved an interpretation of Article III, and not § 1331, of course, the case 
nonetheless speaks to the fundamental division of labor between the federal and state judicial systems. 
That division of labor is still extant today and a rule that facially contradicted it would compromise the 
integrity of the principle. 
224. Of course, for the cases that did involve a federal cause of action but did not implicate the 
purposes underlying federal question jurisdiction, this rule might create undesirable results. Yet that 
does not render the rule inappropriate; it simply makes the rule less preferable on that ground. And 
because there is no other rule that is superior to this rule on the whole, it is improper to disqualify the 
cause of action rule on this ground alone. 
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§ 1331 hurdle in that it is a plausible interpretation of the statute. While 
one cannot say that § 1331 compels a cause of action test, the 
expansive-and even ambiguous-"arising under" language certainly 
does notforeclose such an interpretation.225 
The cause of action test, however, has at least one shortcoming: The 
determination of the existence of a cause of action is not strictly a rule-
based analysis. Rather, the determination depends chiefly on a court's 
analysis of congressional intent.226 Therefore, even though the cause of 
action test proposed herein seems to amount to a rule, it may, in its 
operation work somewhat like a standard. Although the cause of action 
test deprives judges of discretion to assert jurisdiction over claims 
without federal causes of action, it does not deprive them of discretion to 
determine whether such a cause of action exists. 
While this concern does have some merit, it 1s ultimately 
unpersuasive because the cause of action inquiry is not nearly as 
discretionary as is sometimes thought. While courts at one time felt free 
to create rights of action to "effect[ uate] the congressional purpose" 
behind a statute,227 courts today focus more narrowly on whether the 
"text and structure" of the federal statute evince a congressional intent to 
create a right of action.228 Under this stricter inquiry, courts presume 
that if Congress did not explicitly create a right of action, it did not 
intend that the statute be enforced by one.229 While this presumption 
225. While one would expect those who defend judicial discretion to read § 1331 broadly, see 
supra sources cited in note 2, even commentators who define the courts' role narrowly find § 1331 to 
admit of many interpretations. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 21, at 1794 (stating that the "broadly 
phrased 'arising under' statutory language already in existence easily lends itself, both linguistically and 
conceptually," to differing jurisdictional rules). 
226. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
227. J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,433 (1964). 
228. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275; see also Karahalios v. Nat' I Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 
527, 532 (1989) ("The 'ultimate issue' is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of 
action.") (internal quotation marks omitted). While one might posit that discerning congressional intent 
is often a wide-ranging inquiry, the Supreme Court has, in the implied right of action context, 
disapproved of "broad-based notion[s] of congressional intent," such as those based on committee 
reports, congressional acquiescence, and failed legislative proposals. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994). Circuit courts have generally followed this lead. 
See, e.g., Mallett v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, I249 (7th Cir. I997) (recognizing 
the Supreme Court's "evolution in thinking about implied rights of action" and refusing to imply an 
action where there was no evidence of congressional intent overcoming the presumption against an 
implying a right of action); Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429,434 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining 
that pre-Sandoval cases "belong to an 'ancien regime"' where courts were free to '"make effective 
[Congress'] [statutory] purpose'" in enacting a statute) (second alteration in original). 
229. W. Allis Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A strong 
presumption exists against the creation of ... implied rights of action."); La. Landmarks Soc'y, Inc. v. 
City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing this presumption); Stowell v. 
lves, 976 F.2d 65,70 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1992) (same). 
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can be overcome, courts only rarely do so.230 Therefore, under the 
modem cause of action inquiry, judges do not wield discretion freely. 
Moreover, even if some discretion is unavoidable under the cause of 
action test, the discretion is much narrower than that accorded courts 
under the wandering standard promulgated by the Court in Grable & 
Sons.231 Thus, even if the cause of action test is not perfect, it is 
certainly preferable. 
In conclusion, the proper rule for resolving hybrid law jurisdictional 
questions is whether the federal law implicated in the plaintiffs 
complaint is supported by a federal right of action. This rule properly 
allocates the majority of cases to state courts, is consonant with § 1331, 
and will not likely increase judicial discretion or confusion in the right 
of action doctrine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As this Article has shown, the role of discretion in jurisdictional 
determinations by the judiciary involves much more than the legitimacy 
question. Even if the judiciary could legitimately claim discretion to 
modify its jurisdiction, it is not at all clear that such discretion is 
functionally advisable. A detailed study of hybrid law cases reveals that 
the cases are best handled in the lower courts by a bright-line rule and 
not a discretionary approach. Although this Article focused on only a 
small area of federal jurisdiction, its conclusions suggest that the debate 
over discretion must take place not only in the legitimacy sphere but 
also in the functional sphere. Only then will the proper jurisdictional 
rules be formulated. 
230. See Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, supra note 18, 
at 91 (noting that, under the Court's current test, judicial creation of implied rights of action are quite 
rare); Hamilton v. Allen, 396 F.Supp. 2d 545, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (noting that Alexander v. Sandoval 
(which instructed courts to focus only on Congressional intent) and subsequent cases, "suggest a distinct 
narrowing of the implied right of action"). 
231. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367-68 (2005) 
(instructing courts to consider the "welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state 
authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system" to determine whether or not to 
assert federal jurisdiction). 
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VI. APPENDIX 
This chart lists 67 published opinions in which federal circuit courts 
considered whether federal questions embedded within state law actions 
were "substantial" enough to merit federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. The cases represent almost every opinion published by a 
circuit court on this issue between July 8, 1986 and June 13, 2005-the 
span of time between the Merrell Dow and Grable & Sons decisions.232 
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Additive Business disparagement action 
Controls & required reference to federal 
Measurement patent law because defendant's 
Sys., Inc. v. alleged disparagement involved 
Yes FLE s No N/A FlowData, Inc., claims that plaintiff did not own 
986 F.2d 476, patent rights it was selling 
477-79 (Fed 
Cir. 1993). 
Almond v. Suit alleging breach of contract 
Capital Prop., related to parking rates at public 
Inc., 212 F.3d transportation facility required 
20, 22-24 (1st reference to federal law because Yes CIA I No N/A 
Cir. 2000). contract term required parking lot 
owner to obtain approval of rate 
changes from federal agency 
232. Because the search for these cases was done by shepardizing Merrell Dow and Smith v. 
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., it is impossible to say that every case on this issue has been found. 
Conceivably, some courts could have addressed the issue without citing either case, although that would 
be unlikely. See supra note 132 
233. With regard to the context in which the federal question arises, the cases are coded in one of 
three ways. "SIA," which stands for "statutory incorporation action," represents cases where the state 
statute relied upon by the plaintiff incorporates federal law. "CIA," which stands for "contract 
incorporation action," represents cases where the contract forming the basis of the suit incorporated 
federal law. "FLE," which stands for "federal law-as-element," represents cases which federal law 
serves as an element to a state tort or tort-like cause of action. For a detailed description of these 
contexts, see supra text accompanying notes 62-75. 
234. With regard to the degree of interpretation of federal law required of the court, cases are 
coded as either "S" (for "significant") or "I" (for "insignificant"). While I recognize that all cases do not 
fall neatly into one category or the other, it is nonetheless worthwhile to generally classif'y the cases 
because there are significant differences in the amount of interpretation required. For an illustration of 
these differences, see supra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
235. A reversal is defined as any circuit court conclusion that the district court failed to exercise 
its jurisdiction properly. Thus, even if a district made no finding as to its jurisdiction (and simply 
assumed it to exist), a circuit court holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction amounts to a 
reversal. 
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Am. Suit alleging breach of insurance 
Policyholders contract required reference to 
Ins. Co. v. federal CERCLA because loss 
Nyacol event involved environmental 
Products, Inc., contamination regulated by No CIA I Yes No 
989 F.2d 1256, CERCLA 
1263-64 (1st 
Cir. 1993}. 
AmSouth Bank Breach of contract suit by banks 
v. Dale, 386 against insurance companies 
F.3d 763, 777 required reference to the federal 
(6th Cir. 2004 ). Bank Secrecy Act because the No CIA I Yes No 
federal statute regulated portions 
of parties obligations relevant to 
the loss event 
Arthur Young & Suit alleging non-payment for 
Co. v. City of services rendered required 
Richmond, 895 reference to federal copyright law 
Yes CIA s Yes N/A F.2d 967,969- because ownership of copyright 
71 (4th Cir. was predicate to plaintiffs claims 
1990). 
Ayres v. General Suit under state RICO statute 
Motors, Corp., required reference to federal law 
234 F.3d 514, because state statute permits Yes SIA s Yes N/A 
519-20 (lith federal wire and mail frauds to 
Cir. 2000). serve as predicate acts 
B.I.W. Deceived Negligence and Misrepresentation 
v. Local S6, suit required reference to 
Indus. Union of collective bargaining agreement 
Marine and entered pursuant to federal law 
Shipbuilding because agreement prescribed Yes FLE I No N/A 
Workers of Am., certain duties allegedly violated 
132 F.3d 824 
(1st Cir. 1997). 
Baiieyv. Suit under state statute 
Johnson, 48 F.3d prohibiting dispensation of 
965, 968 (6th certain drugs without prescription 
Cir. 1995). required reference to federal No SIA I Yes No 
regulations because state statute 
applied to drugs listed in the 
federal regulation 
Barbara v. N.Y. Tort action for improper 
Stock Exch., disciplinary action by New York 
Inc., 99 F .3d 49, Stock Exchange required 
53-55 (2d Cir. reference to Exchanges internal 
No FLE I No No 1996). rules-which are sanctioned by 
federal agencies-to determine if 
Exchange violated its internal 
rules 
Bassett v. Suit alleging breach of contract in 
Mashantucket development of movie script 
Pequot Tribe, required reference to federal Yes CIA s Yes N/A 





Battle v. Seibels 
Bruce Ins. Co., 
288 F.3d 596, 
607-08 (4th Cir. 
2002). 
Bell Atlantic 
MD, Inc. v. MCI 
WorldCom, Inc., 
240 F.3d 279, 
307-08 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
Berg v. Leason, 
32 F.3d 422, 
424-26 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
Bracey v. Bd. of 
Educ. of City of 
Bridgeport, 368 
F.3d 108, I 13-






F.3d 1050, 1056 
(9th Cir. I 997). 
Campbell v. 
Aerospace 
Corp., 123 F.3d 
1308, 1314-15 
(9th Cir. I 997). 
Carpenter v. 
Wichita Sch. 
Dist., 44 F.3d 
362, 366-68 (5 
th Cir. I 995). 
City of 
Huntsville v. 
City of Madison, 
24 F.3d 169, 
I 73-74 (lith 
Cir. 1994). 
HYBRID LAW CASES 
Facts implicating federal law 
was asserting ownership of a 
copyright 
Suit for breach of flood insurance 
contract required reference to 
federal law because insurance 
contract was underwritten by the 
National Flood Insurance 
Program 
Suit against state regulatory 
commission required reference to 
FCC ruling because plaintiffs 
alleged state commission erred in 
its interpretation of ruling 
Malicious prosecution action 
required reference to federal 
RICO statute in order to 
determine if prosecutor had 
legally tenable ground for 
prosecution under the law 
Suit under state retaliatory 
discharge statute required 
reference to First Amendment of 
U.S. Constitution to determine 
employee's free speech rights 
Suit by Native American tribes 
alleging breach of licensing 
agreement by state government 
required reference to federal 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
because contracts were entered 
into pursuant to the federal act 
Former employee's wrongful 
discharge claim required 
reference to federal False Claims 
Act because plaintiff relied on the 
federal law to establish public 
policy, which was relevant to 
wrongful discharge claim 
Free speech claim predicated on 
state constitution required 
reference to federal precedent on 
First Amendment because state 
courts sometimes rely on such 
precedent in construing state free 
speech rights 
Suit seeking declaration of rights 
under contract for sale of excess 
electricity required reference to 
federal TV A Act because parties 
agreed in the contract to follow 










CIA Yes NIA 
FLE s No No 
FLE s Yes No 
SIA s No N/A 
CIA No N/A 
FLE Yes No 
FLE Yes No 
CIA s No No 
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City of Rome, Suit alleging breach of duty to re-
N.Y. v. Verizon negotiate telecommunications 
Communications contract required reference to 
No CIA s Yes No 
, Inc., 362 F.3d federal Telecommunications Act 
168, 174-76 (2d because statute regulated re-
Cir. 2004). negotiation duties 
Clark v. Velsicol Personal injury suit required 
Chern. Corp., reference to federal 
944 F .2d 196, environmental regulations 
197-99 (4th Cir. because plaintiff sought to rely on No FLE s No No 
1991). defendant's violation of 
regulation as per se evidence of 
negligence 
Custer v. Legal malpractice claim against 
Sweeney, 89 pension fund manager required 
F.3d 1156, reference to federal ERISA 
s No 1168-69 (4th because ERISA provisions No FLE No 
Cir. 1996). regulated certain aspects of 
pension fund management 
D'Alessio v. Injurious falsehood claims against 
N.Y. Stock New York Stock Exchange for 
Exch., Inc., 258 banning plaintiff from trading on 
F.3d 93, 99-104 exchange required reference to Yes FLE I No NIA 
(2d Cir. 200 I). federal securities laws because 
laws controlled Exchange's 
obligations to it members 
Diazv. Legal malpractice claim against 
Sheppard, 85 criminal defense attorney 
F.3d 1502, required reference to U.S. 
1505--06 (lith Supreme Court opinion on Eighth No FLE s Yes No 
Cir. 1996). Amendment to determine if 
attorney's interpretation of case 
was grossly negligent 
Dixon v. Coburg Suit under state unlawful 
Dairy, Inc., 369 termination statute required 
F.3d 811, 816-- reference to First Amendment of No SIA s Yes No 
19 (4th Cir. U.S. Constitution to determine 
2004). employee's free speech rights 
Dunlap v. G&L Suit alleging breach of contract 
Holding Group, related to formation of bank 
Inc., 381 F.3d required reference to (I) federal 
1285, 1291-93 banking regulations because said 
(lith Cir. 2004 ). regulations required contract to be No CIA I Yes No 
in writing and (2) federal 
trademark law because plaintiff 
would have to prove ownership of 
trademark to prevail in suit 
Gaming Corp. of Common law conspiracy claim 
Am. v. Dorsey by Native American tribe 
& Whitney, 88 required reference to federal 
Yes FLE s No NIA F.3d 536, 550- Indian Civil Rights Act because 
51 (8th Cir. tribe alleged defendant had 




Bear, Steams & 
Co., 220 F.3d 





Corp., 68 F.3d 
561, 570-71 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
Griffis v. Gulf 
Coast Pre-Stress 




Her Majesty The 
Queen In Right 
of the Province 
of Ontario v. 
City of Detroit, 
874 F.2d 332, 




S.E. Mich., Inc., 
327 F .3d 466, 
471-72 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
Hill v. Marston, 
13 F.3d 1548, 
1549-50 (lith 
Cir. 1994). 
Hudson Ins. Co. 
v. Am. Elec. 
Corp., 957 F.2d 
HYBRID LAW CASES 
Facts implicating federal law 
Suit to reverse allegedly 
erroneous arbitration award 
required reference to federal law 
because arbitrator's decision was 
predicated in part on federal law 
Suit to enforce collective 
bargaining agreement required 
reference to federal labor law 
because law regulated such 
agreements 
Suit for injury sustained while 
working as longshoreman 
required reference to federal 
harbor workers statute because 
statute allegedly dictates 
vicarious liability in certain 
instances arguably relevant to 
case 
Suit under state environmental 
statute required reference to 
federal law because 
environmental plan at issue in the 
case was required by federal law 
Trespass action against cable 
company required reference to 
federal Cable Act in order to 
determine whether company had 
authority to trespass 
Suit under state securities law 
required reference to federal 
securities law because state 
statute adopted certain federal 
securities laws verbatim 
Suit alleging breach of insurance 
contract required reference to 









FLE s Yes N/A 
CIA Yes No 
FLE No 
SIA Yes No 
FLE s No No 
SIA Yes No 
CIA No No 
236. Of the 44 cases remanded to the state court, this is the only one that arguably involved the 
interpretation of federal law. In Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., Inc., 563 So.2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 
I st Cir. 1990), a Louisiana court of appeals affirmed the unpublished decision by the trial court and 
approved of its adherence to state precedent (Crater v. Mesa Offshore Co. 539 So.2d 88 (La. Ct. App. 
3rd Cir. 1989)) recognizing that the Louisiana workman's compensation scheme was consistent with 
federal law regulation worker's compensation for longshoreman. Thus, although federal law was 
arguably involved in the disposition of this case, the better conclusion is that the state court simply 
applied state precedent in its one-page opinion and made no determination of federal law. Although a 
federal statute was cited, it was not quoted and only barely discussed. 
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826,829-30 event involved environmental 
(lith Cir. 1992). contamination regulated by 
CERCLA 
Interstate Suit alleging breach of gas station 
Petroleum Corp. franchise agreement required 
v. Morgan, 228 reference to Petroleum Marketing 
No CIA I Yes No F.3d 331, 335 Practices Act because certain 
(4th Cir. 2000). franchising agreements are 
regulated by the Act 
Jairath v. Dyer, Suit under state discrimination 
!54 F.3d 1280, statute required reference to 
1282-84 (lith Americans with Disabilities Act No SIA I Yes No 
Cir. 1998). because state statute adopted 
certain ADA provisions verbatim 
Kidd v. S.W. Suiting alleging breach of 
Airlines, Co., employment contract required 
891 F.2d 540, reference to federal law because No CIA I No No 
543-44 (5th Cir. contract adopted certain phrases 
1990). verbatim from federal statute 
Lockyer v. Suit under state statute regulating 
Dynegy, Inc., unfair business practices statute 
375 F.3d 831, required reference to tariffs filed Yes SIA I No N/A 
838-41 (9th Cir. with federal agency to determine 
2004). permissible rate 
MCI Telecomm. Suit alleging breach of contract to 
Corp. v. provide telecommunications 
Graham, 7 F.3d services required reference to 
Yes CIA I Yes NIA 477,478-79 federal law because certain 
(6th Cir. 1993). contractual duties were regulated 
by FCC provisions 
Metheny v. Suit against local zoning board 
Becker, 352 alleging erroneous decision by 
F.3d 458, 460-- board required reference to the 
No FLE s Yes No 61 (1"Cir. federal Telecommunications Act 
2003). because Act allegedly dictated 
board's decision 
Mich. S. R.R. Suit alleging breach of railroad 
Co. v. Branch & contract required reference to 
St. Joseph federal railroad laws because 
Counties Rail contract required party to obtain 
Users Assoc., certificates of operation issued No CIA I No No 
Inc., 287 F .3d pursuant to federal statute 
568,573-74 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
Milan Express Suit by motor carriers alleging 
Co., Inc. v. W. breach of shipping contract 
Surety Co., 886 required reference to federal 
F.2d 783, 786- Interstate Commerce Act because Yes CIA I Yes N/A 
89 (6th Cir. Act and regulations addressed 
1989). substantial portions of contractual 
duties 
Morris v. City of Suit alleging breach of settlement 
No CIA I Yes No Hobart, 39 F.3d agreement in discrimination suit 
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1105, 1111-12 required reference to Title VII of 
(I Oth Cir. 1994). federal Civil Rights Act because 
suit was originally filed as Title 
VII claim 
Mulcahey v. Personal injury suit required 
Columbia reference to federal 
Organic environmental regulations 
Chemicals Co., because plaintiff sought to rely on No FLE s Yes No 
Inc., 29 F.3d defendant's violation of 
148, 151-54 regulation as per se evidence of 
(4th Cir. 1995). negligence 
Nashoba Suit alleging breach of cable TV 
Communications licensing agreement required 
Ltd. P'ship v. reference to federal Cable Act 
Town of because Act regulated tariffs, 
Danvers, 893 which were at issue in the case No CIA s Yes No 
F.2d 435, 438-
39 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
Nichols v. Malicious prosecution action for 
Harbor Venture, pursuit of previous declaratory 
Inc., 284 F.3d judgment suit required reference 
857,860-61 to a consent decree entered by a No FLE I Yes No 
(8th Cir. 2002). federal court because the consent 
decree allegedly foreclosed the 
declaratory judgment suit 
Nicodemus v. Trespass and unjust enrichment 
Union Pac. Co., action against railroad company 
318 F.3d 1231, required reference to federal land 
No FLE s No No 1236-38 (lOth grant laws in order to determine 
Cir. 2003). scope of railroad rights under 
grants 
Oliverv. Breach of contract action for sale 
Trunkline Gas of natural gas required reference 
Co., 796 F.2d to federal law because federal No CIA I Yes No 
86, 88-90 (5th Natural Gas Act set the price of 
Cir. 1986). the contract 
Ormet Corp. v. Breach of contract suit by power 
Ohio Power Co., plant licensee alleging right to 
98 F.3d 799, federal pollution credits required 
806-07 (4th Cir. reference to EPA regulations Yes CIA s Yes No 
1998). because regulations defined who 
an "owner" was for purposes of 
pollution credits 
Pacheco de Personal injury action by 
Perez v. AT & T Venezuelans against U.S 
Co., 139 F.3d company required reference to No FLE s Yes No 
1368, 1374-76 federal treaty because treaty 
(lith Cir. 1998). impacted plaintiffs right to sue 
PCS 2000 LP v. Suit alleging breach of contract to 
Romulus bid certain price for FCC license 
CIA s Telecomm., Inc., required reference to federal law No Yes No 
148 F.3d 32, 35 because FCC regulations regulate 
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Case Name 
(I st Cir. 1998). 
Rice v. Office of 
Servicemembers 
'Group Life 
Ins., 260 F .3d 
1240, 1245-46 
(I Oth Cir. 200 I). 
Rodriguez v. SK 
& F Co., 833 
F.2d 8, 9 (1st 
Cir. 1987). 
Rogers v. Platt, 
814 F.2d 683, 
687-90 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
Sable v. General 
Motors corp., 90 
F.3d 171, 174-
75 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
Seinfeld v. 
Austen, 39 F.3d 
761, 763-65 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
Siegel Transfer, 
Inc. v. Carrier 




Smith v. Indus. 
Valley Title Ins. 
Co., 957 F.2d 
90, 92-93 (3rd 
Cir. 1996). 
Tamiami 
Partners, Ltd. v. 
Miccosuke Tribe 
oflndians of 
Fla., 999 F.2d 
503,507-08 
Facts implicating federal law 
bidding practices for licenses 
(Note: plaintiffs also lodged tort 
action relying on FCC bidding 
regulations. The court similarly 
found federal jurisdiction 
lacking.) 
Suit alleging breach of insurance 
contract to pay death benefits 
required reference to federal law 
because decedent's mental 
state-which was at issue-was 
defined by federal law (due to the 
fact that he was a member of the 
military) 
Wrongful discharge suit required 
reference to federal Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act because 
plaintiff alleged discharge 
occurred in retaliation for refusal 
to violate the federal act 
Child custody suit required 
reference to federal law because 
dispute was regulated in part by 
federal parental kidnapping laws 
Trespass action for failure to 
remove waste from land required 
reference to federal law because 
the duty to remove the waste was 
imposed by a EPA-negotiated 
consent decree 
Derivative action against 
corporate directors required 
reference to federal antitrust laws 
because alleged malfeasance 
involved anti competitive behavior 
Breach of contract suit by motor 
carrier against shipper required 
reference to federal Interstate 
Commerce Act because Act 
regulated certain aspects of such 
contracts 
Conversion claim against 
insurance company for improper 
title insurance charges required 
reference to federal IRS law 
because laws regulated such 
charges 
Suit alleging breach of duty to 
arbitrate contractual disputes 
required reference to federal law 
because federal law controlled 
jurisdiction of Native American 
court, whose judgment was 




No FLE s 
No CIA 
No FLE s 

















Mills of Mass., 
352 F.3d 33, 37-
41 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
Torres v. S. Peru 
Copper Corp., 
113 F.3d 540, 
542-43 (5th Cir. 
1997). 
U.S. Express 
Lines Ltd. v. 
Higgins, 281 
F.3d 383, 388-
91 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
Utley v. Varian 
Assocs., Inc., 




Inc. v. Global 
Naps, Inc., 377 
F .3d 355, 365 
(4th Cir. 2004). 
Virgin Islands 
Hous. Auth. v. 
Am. Arbitration 
Ass'n, 27 F.3d 
911, 916 (3rd 
Cir. 1994). 
W. 14th St. 
Commercial 
Corp. v. 5 W. 
14th Owners 
Corp., 815 F.2d 
188, 194-96 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
W. Union 
Intern., Inc. v. 
Data Dev., Inc., 
41 F.3d 1494, 
HYBRID LAW CASES 
Facts implicating federal law 
partially at issue 
Suit alleging breach of water 
treatment contract required 
reference to federal regulations 
because contract was entered into 
pursuant to permission granted by 
EPA 
Personal injury action against 
large Peruvian company required 
reference to the federal common 
law of international relations 
because holding a major foreign 
company liable in U.S. courts 
could have significant diplomatic 
implications 
Malicious prosecution action 
required reference to federal 
maritime law because plaintiff 
alleged federal law did not 
support defendant's claims before 
the court 
Wrongful termination suit based 
on race required reference to 
federal affirmative action laws 
because federal executive orders 
placed certain duties on 
employers 
Suit alleging that state regulatory 
commission incorrectly 
interpreted federal law during 
regulatory proceedings required 
reference to federal law in order 
to determine the correctness of 
commission's interpretation 
Suit alleging breach of contract 
to build public housing required 
reference to HUD regulations 
because contacts were covered 
under such regulations 
Suit seeking declaration that 
condominium contracts were in 
effect required reference to 
federal condominium statute 
because statute regulated parties' 
obligations under the contract 
Suit alleging failure to pay for 
services rendered by 
telecommunications required 










CIA No No 
FLE s No N/A 
FLE s No N/A 
SIA No No 
FLE s Yes N/A 
CIA Yes No 
CIA s No N/A 
CIA Yes N/A 
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1495-96 (II th Telecommunications Act because 
Cir. 1995). rates charged for services are 
regulated by tariffs filed pursuant 
to Act 
Wander v. Kaus, Suit under state discrimination 
304 F.3d 856, statute required reference to 
858-60 (9th Americans with Disabilities Act No SIA s No No 
Cir.2002). because state statute adopted 
certain ADA provisions verbatim 
